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Introductory Note 
On July 15, 1941 an indictment prepared by the United 
States Department of Justice was handed down by a federal 
grand jury in St. Paul, Minnesota, against 29 members of the 
Socialist Workers P'arty and Motor Transport Workers Local 
544-CIO. It had been preceded by raids on the branch offices 
of the party in St. Paul and Minneapolis, in which large quan-
tities of literature had been carted off by the FBI. The indict-
ment was on two counts: (1) conspiracy to overthrow the 
government by force and violence--the statute involved was 
adopted in 1861 against the slaveholders' rebellion; (2) con-
spiracy to advocate such overthrow and to incite disaffection 
in the arnled forces, being a violation of the Smith I "Gag" 
Law of 1940. 
The trial opened in Minneapolis October 27 and lasted 
five weeks. The jury was out 58 hours. All defendants were 
acquitted on the first count. Eighteen defendants, including 
the outstanding leaders of the Socialist Workers Party, were 
convicted on the second count. On Dece~ber 8--the day the 
United States declared war-twelve defendants were given 
16-month prison sentences and six were sentenced to terms of 
a year and a day. At present all are out on bail while the con-
victions are being appealed to the higher courts. 
The policy of the defense in this historic trial is analyzed 
and discussed in the following pages from two different points 
of view. Grandizo Munis criticizes the courtroom policy of 
the defendants and James P. Cannon defends it. 
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·· A Criticism of the 
Minneapolis Trial 
By GRANDIZO MUNIS 
The initiation on the part of the United States government of 
a prosecution of the Socialist Workers Party and of the leaders of 
the Drivers Union of Minneapolis made us fear a decapitation, 
even though temporary, of our American movement. It filled us 
with a joyful hope at the same time, sure that the persecution by 
the bourgeois tribunals would popularize our revolutionary ideas 
when it gave our militants the opportunity to expound them com-
pletely and valiantly. It has been the norm and pride of the world 
revolutionary movement since the ringing reply of Louisa Michel 
to h~r judges and of Karl Marx to the Bismarckian tribunal, to 
convert the accused into accusers and to employ the witness stand 
as a fortress from which to attack the reactionary powers. This 
attitude has been one of the principal forces of attraction Qf the 
revolutionary movement. 
I experienced the first uneasiness that these results would be 
wasted totally or partially on reading the· first published statement 
(THE MILITANT, Vol. V, No. 29) that seems to have set the 
tone for all the following statements. I recovered hope during the 
first sessions of the trial, during which our comrades energetically 
brought out the reactionary role of the government aided by Tobin 
against the Drivers of S44-CIO. But I again considered as lost a 
goodly part of the political benefits of the trial On reading the fun-
damental speeches and questionings of Comrade Cannon by Com-
rade Goldman, and by the prosecutor (Schweinhaut). It was there, 
replying to the political accusations-struggle against the war, a4-
vocacy of violence, overthrow of the government by force-where 
it was necessary to have raised the tone and turn the tables, accuse 
the governJIlent and the bourgeoisie of a reactionary conspiracy; of 
permanent violence against the majority of the population, physical, 
economic, moral, educative violence; of launching the population into 
a slaughter also by means of violence in order to defend the Sixty 
Families. On the contrary, it is on arriving at this part that the 
trial visibly weakens, our comrades shrink themselves, minimize 
the revolutionary significance of their ideas, try to make an honor-
able impression on the jury without taking into consideration that 
they should talk for the · masses. For moments they border on a 
renunciation of principles. A few good words by Goldman in his 
closing speech cannot negate . the lamentable, negative impression 
of his first speech and of the interrogation of Cannon. 
I shall begin to criticize them by citing their words, taken 
textually from numbers 45, 47, 48, SO, 52, Volume V, of THE 
MiILITANT. 
Goldman in his opening statement to the j~ry: 
"I repeat: The objective and the aim of the party 'lJXL.S to win 
through education and through propaganda a majority of the people 
of the United States." (Underlined in the original.) 
It is exactly the same as the statement in July before the be-
ginning of the trial. Answering a criticism made then from Mexico, 
a comrade of certain responsibility in the SWP replied that there 
was no need to worry because no one was in agreement with that 
statement. I f no one was in agreement, then it was necessary to 
formulate another, that is evident, unless we have one policy for 
the masses and another for appearances before a bourgeois judge. 
It is hardly necessary to indicate the error of such a statement. It 
is understood by all~ beginning by the one who made the state-
ment, that our objective can in no way be only propaganda, nor 
will we win the majority by means of it. Weare a party of propa-
ganda in the sense that our numerical proportion preven~s us or 
limits us to a minimum of action. But we are a party of revolu-
tionary action-economic, political and educative-.-in esse.nce and 
potentially, because our propaganda itself can tend only to action 
and only through action will we conquer the majority of the ex-
ploited and educate them for the taking of power. 
I insist on these cOlnmonplaces because the euphemistic, sweet-
ened character of this preliminary statement of Goldman, designed 
to reconcile the jury, is a compromise that has forced later state-
ments much more grave. We .will see further on . . 
Let us take the main problems and see how they have been 
dealt with in the tria1. 
1. The Struggle Against Imperialist War 
Goldman begins with the following statement: 
"We shall show that the Socialist Workers Party O'pPos,es sabo-
tage. We s·hall show that Mr. Anderson's c1aiml is absolutely wrong 
and based on no foundation ·whatever to the effect that we pref.er the 
enemy, the iDl/perialistic enemy of the United States, to d~eat our 
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government. It is absolutely false. What we want, as the evidence 
will s-how, is to have the workers and farm~rs establish their own 
government, and then to continue a real war against fascism." 
. Cannon even goes a bit further, replying to a question by 
Goldman: 
"l\. decision has been made, and is accepted by a majority of the 
people, to go to war. Our comrades have to. comply with that." 
And then Goldman asks : "You would not support the war?" 
Cannon: "That is what I mean, we would not support the war 
In a political sense." 
And he even returns again to. the point ~ 
uWe consider -Hitler and Hitlerism the greatest .enemy of man-
kind. We -want to wipe it off the face of the earth. The reason we 
do not sUlPPort a declaration of war !by Am.eriea.n arms, is becaus,e 
we do not believe the Amerkan capitalists can defeat Hitler and 
fascism. We think Hitlerism can be destroyed only by way of con-
ducting a war under the leadership of the workers." 
In the first place, the decision to. go to war has not "been made 
and accepted by a majority of the people." This statement can be 
criticized very strongly, a statement that we would censure very 
energ.etically if it were made by a centrist. In place of accusing the 
government of leading the American people to. the slaughter against 
the will of the majority, instead of accusing it emphatically before 
the masses and of demonstrating to them how the parliamentarian 
majority acts against the majority of the peo.ple, Cannon endorses 
Roosevelt's decision as if it really corresponded to the majority of 
the people. 
Yes, 'we submit to. the war and our militants go to war, but 
not because it is a decision of the majority, but rather because it 
is imposed upon us by the violence of the bo.urgeois society just as 
wage exploitation is imposed. As in the factory, we should take 
advantage of all the opportunities to. fight against the war and 
against the s¥stem that produces it, just as we fight against the boss 
in a factory, as a function of the general struggle against the capi-
talist system. 
"We would not support the war in a political sense," says 
Cannon. Do we support it, perhaps, in so.me other sense? Social, 
economic? I do not see other senses. Does he perhaps mean by 
"to support" to accept the accomplished fact and to go to. war? That 
is, to. submit oneself, as we submit to the conditions imposed by a 
boss after the failure of a strike, but preparing ourselves for an-
other. Why, then, equivocate so dangero.usly? I see no other rea-
son but that our comrades have committed the very g;rave error of 
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talking for a petty-bourgeois jury, for the more immediate present, 
not foreseeing the future struggles. Would it not have been better 
to state ~ "We submit to your war, American bourgeois, because the 
violence of your society imposes it on us, the material violence of 
your arms. But the masses will turn against you. From today on, 
our party is with the masses in an irreconcilable struggle against 
your regi~e of oppression, misery and butchery. Therefore we will 
fight against your war ·with all means." 
The equivocation and inexactness are permanent. It seems 
that 'we are platonic opponents of the war and that we limit our-
selves to statements and propaganda, written or verbal, without 
action of any kind. TO'say that "we do not support a declaration 
of 'war because we do not believe the American capitalists can de-
defeat Hitler and fascism" is to give the understanding that we 
would support it if we believed in that defeat; this induces tho.se 
who believe in the victory of the United States to support it. Our 
rejection of the war is based on the character of the social regime 
that produces it, not on thi·s or that belief about the defeat of fas-
cism. 
Immediately comes another equivocation: "We think Hitler-
ism can be destroyed, etc." Uniting that to the reiterated state-
ments to the effect that we will not agitate among the soldiers, that 
we are a "political opposition" to the war, and to the, until now ~ 
limping exposition of military training; under union control, can 
induce one to believe that we will be for the war when the control 
has been given to the unions. I believe it is necessary to clari fy 
this, without leaving room for equivocation and I pronounce myself, 
for my part, against the war, even if control of the military serv-
ice is achieved by the unions. 
Immediately, Cannon undertakes to give a program for de-
feating Hitler by means of a Workers' and Farmers' Government. 
I don't have to add a single comma, except that the entire question-
ing of Cannon closes with a double door, the road to establish the 
Workers' and Farmers' Government: 
4
4iGoldmari: Now until such time as the workers and farmers in 
the United States esta.blish their own government and us·e their own 
methods to defeat Hitler, the S.W.P. must submit to the majority of 
the people-is that right? 
"Cannon: That is all we can do. That is what we propose to dO." 
All of which is the equivalent of folding one's arms after some 
lectures about the marvels of the Workers' and Farmers'. Govern-
ment, in the hope that this will be formed by itself, or by God 
knows what sleight-of-hand. 
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This does not deal merely with an omission, but with a state.:. 
ment of 'passivity in the face of the imperialist war; something 
which at best is a bad education for the workers who have become 
'interested in the trial and does not grant us any I credit for tomorrow 
when the masses begin to act against the war. 
Forced by statements of this sort-decidedly opportunist, I do 
.. not h.esitate to say-Cannon sees himself obliged to ask for the ex-
pulsion from the party of the militants who organize protests in 
the army. He is carried to the incredible, to reject Lenin, Trotsky 
and Cannon himself. 
Mr. Schweinhaut reads Cannon a paragraph of Lenin's from 
The Re·volution of 1905: 
" 'It is our duty in time of an uprising to exterminate ruthlessly 
all the c1;liefs of the civil and military authorities.' You disagr,ee 
with that? 
"Cannon: Yes, I don't know that that is in any way a statement 
of our Iparty ,policy. We do not agree with the e~termination of any-
body unless it is in case of an actual armed struggle when the rules 
of war apply." 
But, what is "an uprising" except an armed struggle? Lenin 
also does not say "anybody" but rather the civil and military chiefs. 
Then 'why reject the paragraph? 
Citing Cannon himself, Schweinhaut reads: 
~, 'The second point (struggle in the army) is to be careful, cau-
tious. Make no lJ)utsches, maJke no prematur~ moves that expos,e us 
and separate us from the masses. Go with the masses .•.. And how 
can we get these military means ,exce!pt ·by penetrating the army as 
it exists?' 
HSchweinhaut: But you do not think that would obstruct the 
military effort of the army? 
"Cannon: If you will read it again, you will see that we do not 
want any putsches. We say to the members: 'Do not mak,e any 
putsches, and do not obstruct the army.' It is our direct instruction 
to our people not to create obstruction of the military operations, 
but to confine their efforts to propaganda." 
I am wholeheartedly behind Cannon in his speech; but I 
categorically condemn Cannon before the jury, deforming himself, 
minimizing;, reducing to words the revolutionary action of the 
party. And I will be equally behind and I propose that the party 
be behind the militants and soldiers who. carry out acts of protests 
in the army, remembering that they do not deal with "putsches, 
premature movements." Revolutionary action in time "Qf war is 
absolutely impossible without obstructing in a greater or less de-
gree the military activities. Therefore, the principle of revolution-
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ary defeatism, which the American party and the International 
have and cannot renounce. Contrary to what Goldman gave to 
understand in the first quotation, we are for the intensification of 
the class struggle, in the rearguard and in the army, including, if 
this can, provoking the defeat of our bourgeoisie:, "From the point 
of view of a revolution in their own country, the defeat of their 
own imperialist government is undoubtedly the better evil" 
(Tro~sky, June 1940). It is worse in advice to the workers to dis-
authorize agitation and protests in the army, only to speak against 
it. I believe that our comrades have lost a good opportunity to 
make the workers understand why they should act always by means 
of the word and by means of collective actions. The questioning of 
Cannon presented a completely false perspective to the workers, 
of comfortable propaganda, where it deals with a terrible struggle 
by all means from small protests . to insurrections by groups, from 
partial fraternizations to wiping out the fronts. But, from an 
error of perspective, one passes to an error of fact; therefore the 
defendants saw themselves forced to condemn sabotage in general, 
as though it dealt with something criminal. I believe that sabotage 
is a method for tactical use whose application at certain moments 
can be productive of contrary effects to what is intended but which 
is absolutely indispensable in the critical moments of struggle. 
An example will demonstrate it. Suppose that in a certain 
part of the front conditions of fraternization are produced. Frater-
nization will never be produced simultaneously on both sides of a 
large front, nor in the same proportion. Immediately the military 
chiefs will give orders to mobilize, attack or reinforce the fronts 
with soldiers less disposed to embrace the "enemy." Is it not our 
duty then to sabotage in the greatest degree the renewal of combat, 
to give time to the fraternization, to impede the command from 
dominating the situation? Sabotage will be the only means at hand 
for the soldiers to extend and precipitate the fraternization, until 
the fall of the two fronts. Nevertheless, there exists the danger that 
the enemy command may dominate its front and taking advantage 
of the disorganization, undertake a victorious of fensive. There is 
no way out for an effective fraternization if one wishes to avoid 
that "danger." 
Sabotage and defeatism will unite at a certain moment as the 
two main elements in the reactions of the masses against the im-
perialist war. The party should not and cannot renounce defeat-
ism without condemning itself to a perpetual sterile chat against 
the war. 
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What seems even more lamentable· to me is that one can intuit 
from the trial that it is not only a question of something said es-
pecially for the jury. F or moments there is evidence that the de'"! . 
fendants really consider sabotage a crime. If I am not mistaken-
and I hope I am-this is a dangerous moral predisposition. Sabo-
tage will be the reaction of the mas,ses against the imperialist war. 
Why be ashamed of it? Why be ashamed that the masses react, as 
they can, against the monstrous crime of the. present war? It would 
have been easy to defend it as a principle and throw ' the respon-
sibility on the leaders of the present war. Can we condemn the 
future sabotage of the masses when the war is a gigantic sabotage 
of the bourgeoisie against the masses, against civilization and hu-
manity? Instead of receiving this idea, the workers who heard our 
comrades will have left, burdened with a prejudice against sabotage. 
2. Transition to Socialism, Advocating and 
Employing Violence 
Says Goldman: 
''The evidence will further show as Mr. Anderson himselt indi-
cated, that we prefer a peaceful transition to SOCialism; but that we 
analyze all the conditions in society, we analyze history, 'and on the 
basis of this analysis we !predkt, we predict, that after the majority 
, of the people in the United States will want socialism estaJbUshed, 
that the minority, organized by the financiers and by carpitaUsts, 
will use violence to pr,event the establishment of socialism. That ia 
what ' we predict." 
Why ,not ask forgiveness, besides, for seeing ourselves pain-
fully obliged to employ violence against the bourgeoisie? Ev~n 
neutralizing oneself to a mere diviner, the prediction is completely 
false. It is not necessary to poke· into the future to discover the 
violence of the reactionary minority throughout society. The ac-
cusation lends itself ideally to launching a thorough attack against 
capitalist society and to show the American workers that the so-
called American democracy is no more than a dictatorship of the 
bourgeoisie. Among the workers 'who have read or listened to 
Cannon and Goldman, there must be many who have experienced 
the daily violence of bourgeois society, during strikes, demonstra-
tions, meetings; all of them without exception experience the nor-
mal violence of either working for a wage established in the labor 
market or of perishing; a violence much more lamentable is the 
imposition of the war; educative violence; informative violence 
imposed by the newspaper trusts. ·Far from receiving a notion of 
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the environment in which they live and far from preparing their 
spirit for rebellion against this environment, the workers watching 
the trial have been pacified in respect to the present. Only in the 
future will the bourgeoisie employ violence. 
Besides, it is completely inexact and contributes toward put-
ting; the workers to sleep, to tell them that the bourgeoisie will em-
ploy violence "after the majority of the people in the United States 
will want socialism established." It uses violence already, always 
employs it, the bourgeoisie knows of no other method of govern-
ment but violence. The workers and farmers should respond to 
the daily violence of the bourgeoisie with majority and organized 
violence of the poor masses. We do not predict, but r~ther we as-
sure, we ask, we advocate temporary violence of the majority 
against the permanent organic violence of the reactionary minority. 
It is necessary to break the democratic prejudices' of the American 
proletariat; but statements like that rock them to sleep. 
"After all," an inexpert worker may say, "what certainty can 
one have that the bourgeoisie will employ violence. These men 
who know a lot, only predict it; then for the moment, I need not 
organize to counter the violence of the reactionaries." This ten-
dency to inaction will be accentuated if the worker in question con-
tinues reading: "We expect to prove that the defendants never 
advocated, never incited, to violence, but simply predicted the vio-
lence of the reactionary minority." It is clear when they do not 
do that, it is ~ot yet necessary. 
And once more, as we saw in the case of the war, all possi-
bility of inciting to action is closed by the preliminary obstruction. 
Following their sense, the perspective presented by our comrades 
for the coming years is also f~lse. . . 
What means 'will be valuable to us for conquering; the majority 
of the proletariat and poor fanners? (N ot merely the people ~s is 
repeated constantly in the examination. The petty-bourgeoisie can 
be neutralized without being won over.) . 
I do not find in the long pages of the interrogation of Cannon 
anything else than propaganda, propaganda and more propaganda, 
as if it dealt with recommending a patent medicine for baldne&s. 
A brief paragraph, uttered in a good direction by Cannon, is not, 
unfortunately, sufficiently explicit and energetic: "Of course, we 
don't limit ourself simply to that prediction. We go further-, and 
advise the workers to bear this in mind and prepare themselves 
not to permit the reactionary outlived minority to frustrate the 
will of the majority." 
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Then, why not raise the voice at this point and call upon the 
workers to organize their own violence against the reactionary 
violence? Immediately afterward, the perspective of struggle 
against the fascist bands is perfectly sketched by Cannon; but one 
notes that it deals with a · non-existent perspective in an immediate 
. fonn as if today against the false democracy it were unnecessary 
to organize the shock forces of the proletariat. It is something 
that is not clearly stated, it lends itself to equivocation and is re-
inforced by the final insistence in denying the existence (today) 
of any workers' guard. At any rate, the lin~ that our comrades 
have followed in not taking advantage of the trial to indicate to the 
masses how and why they should exercis·e their own violence is 
incorrect. Instead we have the lamentable dialogue between Can-
non and Goldman destined to pacify the easily frightened co~­
science of the jury about who initiates the violence. 
In one manner or another it is supposed that we are going to 
conquer the majority for socialism. Then 
"Goldman: What is meant ,by the eXlpression 'overthrow of the 
capitaHst state'? 
"Cannon: That means to replace it by a W.orkers' and Farmers' 
Government; that i,s what w,e mean. 
"Goldman: What is meant by the expression 'destroy the ma-
chinery of the capitalist state'? 
"Cannon: By ,that we mean that when [underlined by me. G.M.] 
we set up the Workers' and Farmers' Government in this country, 
the functioning of this, its tasks, its whole nature, will ·be so pro-
foundly and radically different from the fuundations, tasks and na-
ture of the bourgeois state that we will have to replace it all along 
the line." 
All the revolutionary, violent process, the civil war that must 
precede the establishment of the Workers' and Farmers' Govern-
ment and the proletarian state, is palmed away, I cannot find an-
other ·word more euphemistic. Therefore, when a little bit later 
Cannon has to circumscribe himself, he gives a definition of the 
soviet, such as an abbreviated encyclopedia would give, hushing 
everything that deals with its function as an organism of struggle, 
in competition and opposition to the organisms of the bourgeois 
power. 
What other thing can the Workers' and Farmers' Government 
be than the culmination of the struggle of the proletariat and farm-
ers against the bourgeoisie? . That struggle has to be pushed from 
now on, and beginning with the opening of the revolutionary crisis, 
it will develop "in crescendo," to the point at which the masses 
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will create soviets or councils that direct the general struggle of 
the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, foresee the necessities of 
that struggle, including the arms, and permit within its fold a 
liberty of ideological struggle so that the masses can elect those 
who best represent them. Only then, when the revolutionary ten-
dency has acquired a majority of the soviets-not in the parliamen-
tarian elections-the violent seizure of power will destroy the 
bourgeois state, leaving the soviets as the base of the proletarian 
state. 
Cannon stated that the machine of the bourgeois state will be 
destroyed "when we set up the Workers' and Farmers' Govern-
ment." But the possibility of such a governffient does not open 
until after we have destroyed that machine. Cannon knows this 
perfectly, and undoubtedly, proposes to act accordingly. But in 
that case, I insist, why lose the excellent and rare opportunity to 
give the workers a lesson, indicating to them without subterfuge 
the road to the struggle and power, accusing at the s~e time the 
bourgeoisie of a reactionary and pro-fascist course? The predic-
tions about how the social dialectic is going to reinforce our posi-
tions, do not have any real value for the workers. The revolution-
ary process is seen here as the school books will describe it in 500 
years. The workers today need an indication of the dynamics of 
the class struggle, the forms of organization, methods of struggle 
up to the civil war, slogans, and included there is a need for proud 
valour against the class enemy, something which has been rare in 
the trial. The general tone has been not to accuse but to apologize 
to a point that makes one feel embarrassed at times; not to indi-
cate and propose actions and immediate means for the struggle 
against the bourgeoisie and against the war, but rather to dilute 
our ideas into hunlanitarianism and to veil their active value with 
predictions of knowledge as if it were not honor~ble to employ 
violence against the present corrupted bourgeois democracy. 
Something completely demonstrative of the foregoing is that 
our comrades have cited as witnesses in their defense-Jefferson, 
Lincoln, the Bible, Lloyd George, MacDonald; · but when Marx, 
Lenin, Trotsky and even Cannon appear, they are rejected as non-
of ficial mouthpieces of our organization. This attitude, not very 
valiant, ,annot conquer much sympathy, or at least cannot conquer 
as much as the opposite attitude would conquer. 
I know perfectly well that I am not teaching anything to any-
body. What I have said is known better by the comrades to whom 
it refers. They will agree with me in relation to the principles re-
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ferred to, except perhaps, in the problems of military training 
under trade union control, and sabotage--questions that it is urgent 
to clarify in the party and in the International. I find no more 
reason for their attitude in the trial than considerations that it 
would be a "useful maneuver." But it is precisely that I consider 
it a very grave error to substitute maneuvers for principles in mo-
ments so important Jor the political fl:1ture of the party. I believe 
and propose as a general principle that in similar trials our respon-
sible militants accept all responsibility for the practical action of 
our ideas. This is worth more than a light sentence at the price of 
a pretty and deceptive polish. I propose that this criticism be pub-
lished in the internal bulletins of the International and of the 
S.W.p. 
January 7, 1942 
NOTE: This criticism has been written with extreme 'rush, in 
order not to lose an immediate opportunity to transmit it. I have 
not taken more than the paragraphs that first struck my eyes. 
Therefore, I reserve the possibility of amplifying it. 
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Political Principles and 
Propaganda Methods 
By JAMES P. CANNON 
1. Our Strategy in the Trial 
In the Minneapolis "sedition" trial, as in the months-long 
trade union battle which preceded and led up to it, the American 
Trotskyists were put to the test and compelled to show what stuff 
they are made of. In both instances they conducted themselves in 
a manner befitting disciples of Trotsky and met the test in all 
respects. 
In the fight with the trade union bureaucracy, which attracted 
national attention, it was clearly shown who the real leaders of 
militant labor, the real men of principle, really are. In the trial 
before the bourgeois court the party, by the conduct of all its mem-
bers involved, earned the right to the confidence of the revQlu-
tionary workers. The two struggles, which in reality were two 
sides of 'One and the same struggle, marked a climactic point in the 
activity 'Of the American movement which had developed in a re-
stricted circle since its inception thirteen years before. 
Duringi that time the party, with some local exceptions, had 
gained the attention only of the vanguard of class conscious work-
ers. At the trial we had the opportunity, for the first time, to 
speak to the masses-to the people of the United States. We 
seized upon the opportunity and made the most of it, and applied 
in practice without a serious fault the basic principles which had 
been assimilated in a long preparatory period. Since then the 
movement in the United States stands on higher ground. 
A critical study and discussion of the trial cannot fail to ~ 
of the highest value to the Fourth International, especially to those 
sections which have yet to reach the tum in the road which leads 
from the propaganda circle to mass work. For our part, we wel-
come the discussion and will do our best to contribute something 
useful to it. 
From the first moment after the indictment was brought 
against us in the Federal Court at Minneapolis last July we recog-
16 
nized that the attack had two aspects, and we appraised each of 
them, we think, at their true significance. The prosecution was 
designed to outlaw the party and deprive it, perhaps for a long 
time, of the active services of a number of its most experienced 
leaders. At the same time it w.as obvious that the mass trial, prop-
erly handled on our part, could give us our first real opportunity 
to make the party and its princi pIes known to wide circles of 
workers and to gain a sympathetic hearing from them. 
Our strategy, from the beginning, took both sides of the prob-
lem into account. N ~turally, we decided to utilize to the fullest ex-
tent each and every legal protection, technicality and resource 
a vailable to us under the law and the constitution. A party leader-
ship hesitating or neglecting to do this would frivolously jeop-
ardize the legality of the party and show a very wasteful attitude 
indeed toward party cadres. Such a leadership would deserve only 
to be driven out with sticks and stones. 
On the other hand, we planned to conduct our defense in 
court not as a "criminal" defense but as a propaganda offensive. 
Without foolishly disregarding or provoking the jury or needlessly 
helping the prosecutor, it was our aim to use the courtroom as a 
forum to popularize the principles of our movement. We saw in 
thi$ second proposition our main duty and opportunity and never 
for a moment intended to let purely legalistic considerations take 
precedence over it. Therefore ,we sternly rejected the repeated ad-
vice of. attorneys-some who assisted Goldman in the trial of the 
case as well as others who were consulted about participation-to 
eliminate or play down our "propaganda" program and leave the 
defense policy to the lawyers. 
From the rather unhappy experiences of past trials of mili-
tants in the courts of the United States we knew what following 
such advice would mean ~ Deny or keep quiet about the revolution-
ary principles of the movement; permit the lawyers to disavow 
and ridicule the defendants, and pass them "off as somewhat fool-
ish people belonging to a party which is not to be taken seriously; 
and depend on spread-eagle speeches of the lawyers to the jury 
to get the defendants off some way or other. 
The October Plenum-Conference of the party unanimously 
endorsed the National Committee's recommendations on courtroom 
policy. The resolution q£ the conference laid down the policy as 
follows: 
''The poliey of the party in defending itself in court, obligatory 
for all ,party mem bers under indictment. can only be one that is 
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worthy of our movement and our tradiUon; no attempt to water 
d-own or evade our revolutionary doctrine, but, -on the contrary, to 
defend it militantly. At the same tim.e we maintain that we have a 
legal right under the Bill of Rights to propagate our ~rinciples:' 
That is the policy we took with us to the trial. It guided us 
at every step in the proceedings. And we think it can be safely 
said that the policy has been amply vindicated by the results. Our 
principles were widely popularized, a hundred or a thousand times 
better than ever before, and our conduct before the court has met 
with approval and sympathy from the militant workers who fol-
lowed the trial and read the testimony. 
The trial was by far our greatest propaganda success. More-
over, even those workers who disagree with our program, have 
approved and applauded our conduct in court as worthy of people 
who take their principles ~eriously. Such is the testimony of all 
comrades who have reported on the reaction of the workers to the 
trial. On a recent tour across the country from branch to branch 
of the party we heard the same unvarying report everywhere. 
Naturally, our work in the trial was not perfect; we did only 
the best we could within the narrow limits prescribed by the court. 
More qualified people can quite easily point out things here and 
there which might have been done more cleverly. We can readily 
acknowledge the justice of such criticisms without thereby admit-
ting any guilt on our part, for socialism does not require that all 
be endowed with equal talent, but only that each give according to 
his ability. It is a different matter when Comrade M unis-and 
other critics of our policy-. accuse us of misunderstanding our task 
and departing from Marxist principles in the trial. To them we 
are obliged to say firmly: No, the misunderstanding is all on your 
s!de. The correct understanding of our task in the courtroom and 
the sanction of the Mfarxist authorities, are on our side. 
In undertaking to prove this contention we must begin with 
a brief analysis of a point overlooked by M unis as well as by 
the others: the social environment in which the trial was con-
ducted. Our critics nowhere, by so much as a si~gle word, refer 
to the objective situation in the United States; the political fonns 
still prevailing here; the degree of political maturity-more prop-
erly, immaturity-of the American proletariat; the relation of class 
forces; the size and stat~s of the party-in short, to the specific 
peculiarities of our problem which should determine our method 
of approach to workers hearing us for the first time .from the 
souriding board of the trial. 
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Our critics talk in ·terms of trials in general and principles in 
general, which, it would appear, are always to be formulated and 
explained to the \'Torkers in general in precisely the same way. We, 
on the contrary, dealt with a specific trial and attempted to explain 
ourselves to the workers as they are in the United States in the 
year 1941. Thus we clash with our critics at the very point of de-
parture-the analysis, the method. Our answer to their criticism 
must take the same form. 
We shall begin by first setting forth the concrete environ-
mental circumstances in which our party functioned in the United 
States at the time of the trial and the specific tasks and propaganda 
techniques which, in our opinion, were thereby imposed. Then we 
shall proceed to submit our position, as well as that of our critics, 
to the criterion which must be decisive for all of us: the expres-
sions of the Marxist teachers on the application of the points of 
principle under discussion. * 
2. The Setting of the Trial 
The United States, where the trial took place, is by far the 
richest of all the capitalist nations, and because of that has been 
one of the few such nations still able to afford the luxury of bour-
gois democratic forms in the epoch of the decline and decay of 
capitalism. Trade unions, which have been destroyed in one Eu-
ropean country after another in the past decade, have flourished 
and more than doubled their membership in the United S~ates in 
the same period-partly with governmental encouragement. Free 
speech and free press, obliterated or reduced to travesty in other 
lands, have been virtually unrestricted here. Elections have been 
held under the normal bourgeois democratic forms, traditional in 
America for more than a century, and the great mass of the work-
ers have freely participated in them. The riches and favored po-
sition of bourgeois America have also enabled it, despite the devas-
tating crisis, to maintain living standards of the workers far above 
those of any other country. 
These objective circumstances have unfailingly affected both 
the mentality of the workers and the fortunes of the revolutionary 
political movement. The revolutionary implications of the shaken 
economy, propped up for the time being by the armaments boom, 
are as yet but slightly reflected in the consciousness of the workers. 
In their outlook they are far from revolutionary. "Politics" to 
* All Quotati-ons cited in this document are from the EngUsh texts. 
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them means voting for one or another of the big capitalist parties. 
The simple fact that the organized labor movement has not yet 
resorted to independent political action, even on a reformist basis, 
but remains in its political activity an appendage of the Roosevelt 
political party-this simple fact in itself shows conclusively that 
the American workers have not yet begun to translate their fier~e 
militancy on the field of economic strikes, directed at individual em-
ployers, into terms of independent politics directed against the 
employers as a class. As for the Marxist party, with its program 
of the revolutionary transformation of society, it has been able in 
such an environment to attract the attention of only a few thou-
sands to its message and to recruit into its ranks a still smaller 
number of the most advanced and class conscious militants. 
The forty million American workers, casting an almost solid 
labor vote for Roosevelt, remain in the first primitive stages of 
class political development; they are soaked through and through 
with bourgeois democratic illusions; they are discontented to a 
certain extent and partly union conscious but not class conscious; 
they have a fetishistic respect for the Federal government as the 
government of all the people and hope to better conditions for them-
selves by voting for "friendly" hourgeois politicians; they hate and 
fear fascism which they identify with Hitler; they understand social-
ism and communism only in the version disseminated by the bour-
geois press, and are either hostile or indifferent to it; the real mean-
ing of socialism, the revolutionary Marxist meaning, is unknown to 
the great majority. 
Such were the general external factors, and such was the men-
tality of the American workers, confronting our party at the time 
of the Minneapolis trial, October, November, and December 1941. 
What specific tasks, what propaganda techniques were imposed 
thereby? It seems to us that the answers are obvious. The task 
was to get a hearing for our ideas from the forum of the trial. 
These ideas had to be simplified as much as possible, tnade plau-
sible to the workers and illustrated whenever possible by familiar 
examples from American history. We had to address ourselves 
to the workers not in general, not as an abstraction, but ' as they 
exist in reality in the United States in the year 1941. We had to 
recognize that the forms of democracy and the legality of the party 
greatly facilitate this propaganda work and must not be lightly dis-
regarded. It was not our duty to facilitate the work of the prose-
cuting attorney but to make it more d~fficult, insofar as this could 
be done 'without renouncing any principle. Such are the con sid era-
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tions which g,uided us in our work at the trial. 
Our critics do not refer to them; evidently they did not even 
think of them. Our method is a far different method than the 
simple repetition of formulas about "action" which requires noth-
ing but a good memory. More precisely, it is the Marxist method 
of applying principles to concrete circumstances in order to popu-
larize a party and create a movement which can lead to action in 
the real life of the class struggle, not on the printed page where 
the "action" of sectarian formalists always begins and ends. 
The accomplishment of our main task-to use the courtroom 
as a forum from which to speak to those American workers, as 
they are, ·who might hear us for the first time-required, in our 
judgment, not a call to arms but patient, school-room explanations 
of our doctrines and ourselves, and a quiet tone. Therefore we 
adapted, not our principles but our propaganda technique to the 
occasion as we understood it. The style of propaganda and the 
tone which we employed are not recommended as a universally ap-
plicable formula. Our propaganda style and tone were simply de-
signed to serve the requirements, in .the given situation, of a small . 
minority Marxist party in a big country of democratic capitalism 
in the general historic circumstances above described. . 
Comrade M unis accuses us 0 f popularizing our propaganqa . 
and defending ourselves (and the party's legality) at the expense 
of principle. Our s.tatements at the trial are held to be "decidedly· 
opportunist"; to "border on a renunciation of principles." Follow-
ing such and similar assertions we are informed that "it is a very 
grave error to substitute maneuvers for principles." This maxim-
not entirely original in our movement-can be accepted with these 
provisos: that the maxim be understood; that a distinction be 
made bet'ween "maneuvers" which serve principle and those which 
contradict it; and that it be applied to actual and not imaginary 
sacrifices of principle. This is the gist of the whole matter. The 
Marxist teachers did not change their principles, but in explaining 
them they frequently changed their manner and tone and points 
of emphasis to suit occasion. We had a right and a duty to do the 
same. An examination of our testimony from this standpoint will 
bring different conclusions from those which our critics have so 
hastily drawn. 
3. Violence and the Transition to Socialism 
We . were charged in the first count of the indictment with 
"conspiracy to overthrow the government by force and violence" 
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in violation of the statute of 1861 which was originally directed 
against the slave-holders' rebellion. In the second count we were 
charged, among other things, with "conspiracy to advocate, the 
overthrow of the government by force and violence" in violation 
of the Smith Act of 1940. 
In our defense we flatly denied we had either "conspired" or 
"advocated" violence, and by that we did not in the least intend 
to deny or repudiate any principle of Marxism. 'Ve claimed the 
right to c%plain our position. We testified that 'we prefer a peace-
ful social transformation; that the bourgeoisie takes the initiativ~ 
in violence and will not permit a peaceful change; that we advise 
the workers to bear this in mind and prepare to defend themselves 
against the violence of the outlived reactionary minority class. 
This formula-which is 100 per cent correct in the essence of 
the matter and unassailable from the standpoint of Marxist au-
thority-did not coincide with the contentions of the prosecuting 
attorney, nor help him to prove his case against us. But that was 
not our duty. From entirely opposite considerations our exposi-
tion does not meet with the approval of Comrade M unis nor co-
incide with his conceptions. That is not our duty either, because 
his conceptions are arbitrary and formalistic-and therefore false. 
The prosecutor wanted to limit the whole discussion of so-
cialism to the single question of "force and violence." We on the 
other hand-for the first time in an American courtroom-tried 
to make an exposition, if only a brief and sketchy one, of the 
whole range of Marxist theory, as in an elementary study class 
for uninitiated workers, to the extent that this was possible within 
the narrow frame-work prescribed by the court's rules and the 
repeated objections of the prosecutor, assigning the question of 
force in the social revolution to its proper proportionate place and 
putting the responsibility for it where it properly belongs-on the 
shoulders of the outlived class. 
We carried out this task to the' best of our ability at the trial. 
Of course, thesis precision and full-rounded explanation are hardly 
possible in a rapid-fire impromptu dialogue, with answers com-
pressed to extreme brevity by time limitations, prosecutor's ob-
jections and court ruling,s. We cannot claim such precision and 
amplitude for our answers, and reasonable people should not de-
mand it of us. Even Trotsky admitted the possibility of flaws in 
testimony which he gave in somewhat similar but more favorable 
circumstances before the Dewey Commission. In reply to Ver, who 
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bad criticized one of his answers in the published record of the 
Inquiry, he said: 
"It is possible that there is some laek of lPTecision in the steno-
graphic report. It is not a -matter her,e either of a programmatic 
text well thought out, or even of an article, but of a stenographic 
report drawn up lby the Commission. You .know that I did not even 
have the chance to revise it myself. Some misunderstandings, im-
precisions may have crept in. Enemies can make use of them, but 
serious com.rades must grasp the question in its totality." (Internal 
Bulletin of the Socialist Workers Party, No.3.) 
Here it may be in order to explain that American court proce-
dure, unlike that of many other countries, does . not permit defen-
dants to introduce worked-out statements and "declarations." They 
must answer orally, they must make their answers short and are 
liable to be cut off at any time by the objection of the prosecutor 
or the ruling of the judge. In such an atmosphere a witness is 
under constant pressure to condense his answers and to omit ex-
planations which may be necessary for full clarity but which are 
not interesting to the court. . 
We mention these factors only to ask the same kind of rea-
sonable allowance for short-comings which Trotsky asked, not to 
disavow anything we said. By and large, making all due acknowl-
edgment of imperfections, omissions and inadequacies in the oral 
testimony, we accomplished our propagandistic aims at the trial, 
and we stand on the record. The court record, published in thousands 
of copies, became and will remain our most effective propaganda 
document. It is an honest and forthright revolutionary record. 
Nobody 'will succeed ' in discrediting it. 
What did we say about violence in the transformation of s0-
ciety from capitalism to socialism? This is what we said: 
1) The Marxists prefer a peaceful transition. "'The position of the 
Marxists is that the most economical and ~referable, the moOst de-
sira·ble method of social transformation, by all .means, is toO have 
it done peacefully." (From the court record, Socialism on Trial, 
page 34.) 
2) "It is the Qpinion of all Marxists that it will be accompanied by 
violence." (Socialism on Trial, page 33.) 
3) That opinion "i's based, like all Marxist doctrine, on a study ot 
history, th~ historical experiences of mankind in the numerous 
changes of society from one form to another, the revolutions 
which acc.ompanied it, and the resistance which the outlived . 
classes -invariably ·put up against the new order. Their attempt 
to defend themselves against the new !Order, or to suppress by 
violeuce the movement for the new or~er, has resulted in every 
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important social transformation up to now being accompanied 
by violence." (Socialism on Trial, page 33.) 
4) The -ruling class always initiates the violence, "always the ruling 
class; always the outlived class that doesn't want to leave the 
stage when the time has oome. They want to hang onto their 
privileges, to reinforce them by violent measures, against the 
risin.g majority ana they run up against the mass violence of the 
new class, which history has ordained shall com,e to power." (is<>-
cialism on Trial, !page 33.) 
5) That is our prediction. But "of course, we don't limit ourselves 
simply to that predktion. We go further, and advise the workers 
to bear this in mind and 'prepare themselv,es not to permit the 
reactionary o'utlived minority to frustrat.e the will of the majori-
ty." (Socialism on Trial, page 35.) 
"QUESTION: What role does the rise and existence of ta.seism 
play with ref,erence to the possibility of violence? 
HANSWER: Well, that is really the nub o'f the whole question, 
!because the reacUonary violence of the eapitalist class, expressed 
through fascism, is invoked against the workers. Long beto·re the 
revolutionary movement of th~ workers gains the majority, fas-
cist gangs are organized and subsidized ,by millions in funds from 
the ,biggest i~dustrialists and financiers, as the example of Ger-
many showed-and thes~ fascist gangs undertake to break up the 
labor movement by force, raid the halls, assassinate the leaders, 
·break up the meetings, burn the printing !plants, arid destroy the 
possibility of functioning long ·before the labor move'ment has 
taken the road of revolution. 
"I say that is the nub of the whole question of violence. If the 
workers don't recognIze that, and do not begin to defend them-
'Belves against the fascists, t~ey will never be given the pos'Siibility 
of voting on the question of revolution. They will .face the fate 
" of the German and Italian proletariat and they will be in the 
chains of fascist slavery before they ha v,~ a .chance of any kind 
,of a fair vote on whether they want Socialism or not. 
"It is a life and death question for the workers that they or-
ganize themselves to prevent faseism, the fascist gangs, from 
.breaking up .the workers' organizations, · and not to wait until it 
is too late. T·hat is the program of our pa·rty." (Socialism on 
Trial, page 35.) 
That is all any Marxist really needs to say on the question 
of violence in a capitalist court or at a propaganda meeting for 
workers at the present time in the United States. It tells the truth, 
conforms to pri~ciple,. and protects the legal position of the party. 
The workers will understand it too. To quote Shakespeare's Mer-
24: 
cutio: "'Tis not ~o ~eep as ~,well, nor so wide as a church-door; 
but 'tis enough, twdl serve.. ... " 
Comrade Munis, however, 1S not satIsf1ed wIth our lamentable 
dialogue," allegedly "destined t~ ~~cify the e~si1y fr~¥htened con-
science of the jury about who 1n1tIates the v10lence. The above 
quoted answer advising the workers to "bear in mind" the violent 
course of the ruling class and "prepare themselves," is not "suf-
ficiently explicit and energetic." (He underestimates the acuteness 
of the workers.) "Why not," says Comrade M unis, "raise the 
voice at this point and call upon the workers to organize their own 
violence against the reactionary violence?" 
Why not? Because it was not necessary or advisable ~ither 
to raise the voice or issue any call for action at this time. We were 
talking, in the first place, for the benefit of the uninitiated worker 
who would be reading the testimony in the paper or in pamphlet 
form. We needed a calm and careful exposition in order to get 
his attention. This worker is by no means 'waiting impatiently 
for our call to violent action. Quite the contrary, he ardently be-
heves in the so-called democracy, and the first question he will 
ask, if he becomes interested in socialism, is: "Why can't we get 
it peacefully, by the ballot?" It is necessary to patiently explain 
to him that, while we would prefer it that way, the bosses will 
110t permit it, will resort to violence against the majority, and 
that the workers must defend themselves and their right to change 
things. Our defensive formula is not only legally unassailable, 
"for the jury," as our critics contemptuously remark - as though 
28 indicted people in their right senses, and a party threatened with 
illegality, can afford the luxury of disregarding the jury. It is 
also the best formula for effective propaganda. 
These defensive formulas are. not our invention; they come 
directly from the great Marxists who did not believe in the good 
will of the class enemies and knew how to organize action, that 
is, mass action, against them. And these saqJe teachers and organ-
izers of mass actions likewise never failed to appreciate the value 
c f democratic forms and party legality and to hang onto them 
and utilize them to the fullest extent possible. Our teachers did 
110t shrink from force; they never deluded the workers with the 
promi~e ~f a peaceful~ democratic transformation of sQciety. But 
they dIdn t ~peak of VIolence always in the same way, in the same 
tone and WIth the same emphasis. Always, in circumstances in 
any ~ay comparable .to. ours, they have spoken as we spo~e at 
the trial. Proof of thiS 15 abundant and overwhelming. 
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The first formulated statement of the communist position on 
the question of violence and the transition to socialism appears 
in Engels' "Principles of Communism," a "catechism" written in 
1847 which is generally regarded as the first draft of the Com-
munist Manifesto. Engels wrote ~ 
"Question Sixte.en: Will it be possible to bring about the aboli-
tion of private property by peaceful methods? 
"Answer: It is a thing greatly to be desired, and communists 
would be the last ,persons in the wo-rld to stand in the way of a 
,p.eaceful soluti:on." (International Publishers edition of The Com-
,mu,nist Manifesto, Marxist Library, Volume III, pa.ge 330.) 
Engels didn't promise such a solution and he didn't forget 
to add: "Should the oppressed proletariat at long last be goaded 
into a revolution, the commu~ists will rally to the cause of the 
workers and be just as prompt to act as they are now to speak." 
The last statement of Marxist authority, expressed by Trotsky 
93 , years later, follows the same pattern as that of Engels. In tlie 
summer of 1940 the Dies Committee conducted a raid on a com-
rade's house in Texas and carried off some party literature. An-
ticipating an attack on the legal position of the Socialist Workers 
Party, Comrade Trotsky wrote us a letter, advising us how to 
formulate our propaganda and defend ourselves "from the legal 
point of view" and warning us not "to ·furnish any pretext for 
persecutions." This letter, as though written to answer in advance 
the ultra-radical quibbling about the Minneapolis trial, was printed 
in Fourth International, October 1940, page 126. Trotsky wrote: 
"The Texas story is very important. The attitude of the peop.le 
involved can become decisive from the le'gal point of view. 
"We, of course, cannot imitate the Stalinists who proclaim, their 
wbsolute devotion to the bourgeois democracy. Howev,er, we do not 
wish to furnish any pretext for ~rsecutions. 
"In this case, as in any others, we should speak the truth as it 
is; namely, the best, the most economical and favorable method for 
the masses would be to achieve the transformation of this society by 
democratic means. The democracy i·s also necessary for the organi-
zation and .education of the masses. That Is w·hy we are always 
rea.dy to defend the democratic rights of the people by our own 
means. However, we know on the 'basis of tremendous historical ex-
'parience that the 60 Families will never permit the democratic real-
ization ,of socialist princf.ples. At a given moment the 60 Families 
will inevitably overthrow, or try to overthrow, the democratic insti-
tutions and replace them -by a reactionary dictatorship. T·his is what 
happened in Italy, in Ger~ny and in the last days in France-not, 
to mention the lesser countries. We say in advance that we are 
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ready to reject such an attempt wUh arms in hands, and crush the 
fascist dictatorship by a proletarian dictatorship. 
"This position corr.e's'ponds to the historical r~ality an,d is juri-
dically unattackable." 
These words, written by the founder of our movement in the 
last month of his life, were not chance remarks thrown off at ran-
dom. They 'were written in direct connection with an expected 
prosecution, and he specifically wa~n:d us that "the attit~de of 
the people involved can become decIsive from the legal pOint of 
view." He knew the value of party legality and did not want us 
to jeopardize it needlessly. Do not, he said almost in so many 
words, accept the prosecuting attorney's accusation that we advocate 
conspiratorial violence by a minority. Present the question in a 
way which "corresponds to historical reality" and which is, at 
the same time, by its defensive formulation, "juridically unattack-
able." 
That letter was the guiding line for our policy at the trial. We 
took the words of Trotsky as Marxist authority. For us there is 
no higher. Our movement, the movement of the Fourth Inter-
national which stems directly from the struggle of the Trotskyist 
Opposition in Russia since 1923, embodies in its doctrine and its 
tradition the whole of Marxism and the whole of the precepts 
and example of Lenin, developed and applied to conditions of 
the post-Lenin period. We know it is the fashion in late years 
for some people to contrast Lenin· to Trotsky and to refer to 
Lenin as the primary authority. The Oehlerites in the United 
States, for example, advertise themselves as "Leninists" of this 
type; and even Shachtman, dabbling 'with radicalism for a season, 
tried to invoke Lenin agaInst the military policy elaborated by 
Trotsky. There is no more truth or merit in this burlesque than 
there was in the attempt of the opportunists during the first World 
War to appeal to Marx and Engels against Lenin. 
All four of the great Marxist authorities - Marx, Engels, 
Lenin and Trotsky - are united in an uninterrupted continuity of 
experience reflected in Marxist thought. For us, Lenin is Marx 
in the epoch of the first World War and the October revolution. 
Trotsky is Lenin in the epoch of Stalinist degeneration and the 
struggle against it, the epoch of fascism and the second W orId War 
and the preparation of the new rise of the international revolution of 
the proletariat. 
These "Leninists" - God save the mark! - are fond of re-
peating isolated quotations from Lenin as fixed and final answers 
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to current problems which arise ever new and in infinite variations 
of circumstance. A greater distortion of Leninism _ - which is a 
method, not a collection of bible texts - can hardly be imagined. 
They repeat the words of Lenin on this or that occasion without 
understanding that Lenin did not always repeat himself and had, 
nothing but contempt for such thought-saving substitutes for living 
Marxism. An ' instructive sample of this practice is the attempt 
of Munis to picture us as "rejecting" Lenin because we took the 
liberty of saying a sentence he wrote about insurrection in Czarist 
Russia in 1906 is not applicable for our propaganda in the United 
States in 1941. 
Our frank avowal before the court that we are disciples of 
Lenin is not enough to satisfy ;Munis. Our statements that in our 
nlovement "he holds a position of esteem, on a level with Marx"; 
that "the basic ideas and doctrines, practiced, promulgated and 
carried out _by Lenin, are supported by ou~ movement" - these 
declarations, in the judgment of our critic, are not sufficient to 
c-onstitute an acceptance of Lenin. He seems to think it is necessary 
tt.' repeat and accept as gospel every word Lenin said on every 
occasion regardless of what Lenin himself may have said on the 
same subj ect on other occasions. 
He cites the question of Mr. Schweinhaut, the prosecutor, 
reading a sentence .from -Lenin's "The Revolution of 1905": "'It 
is our duty in time of an uprising to exterminate ruthlessly all 
the chiefs of the civil and military authorities.' You disagr~e with 
that ?" 
Naturally we denied that this is a statement of party policy 
here and now, modifying it as follows: "We do not agree with 
the extermination of anybody unless - it is in case of an actual 
armed struggle when the rules of war apply."- In reality this was 
saying, out of deference to Lenin, a great deal more than needs 
to be said on the subject of extermination before a capitalist court 
or in a propaganda speech in the United States at the present time. 
But this does not satisfy Munis. Why, he demands, ' say "anybody" 
instead <?f "the civil and military chiefs"? "Why reject the para-
graph ?" We must repeat Lenin word for -word! 
Why must we? Lenin didn7 t repeat' hitnSelf word _for word. 
Far from it, he changed and modified such formulas to suit occa-
sion without ceremony. In fact, on the very eve of the October 
revolution, he changed this _ particular formula so radically as to 
give it a quite different, "milder" meaning, in order better to serve 
his political aims at the time. In his letter to the Central Co~mittee, 
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d t d September 26-27, 1917, a letter coiling for the organization a e . f " .. " d of the fnsu.,.,.ection, he omtts any re erence to extermtnatIon an 
s1mply says: "We must arrest the general staff and the govern-
ment." (Lenin: Selected Works - Vol. VI, Page 223. Our em-
phasis.) 
On still another occasion, September 14-16, 1917, offering. a 
Hcompromise" to the S.R. and Menshevik majority, Lenin proposed 
that they form an S.R.-Menshevik government responsible only to 
the Soviets. Such a government, he said, "in all probability could 
secure a peaceful forward march of the whole Russian Revolu-
tion." Should the proposition be accepted by. the S.R.'s and Men-
sheviks, then: 
"No other condiUon would, I think, be advanced 'by the Bol-
sheviks, who would be confident that really full fre,edom of propa-
ganda and the immediate realization of a new democracy in the 
composition of the -Soviets (new elections to them) and in their 
functioning would in themselves secur,e a pea'ceful forward move-
ment of th~ revolution, a peac~luJ outcome of the party strike within 
the Soviets. 
"Perhaps this is already impossible? Perhaps. But if ther.e is 
even one chance in a hundred, the attempt at realizing such a possi-
bility would still be worth while." ('Lenin: Collected Works, Vo1. XXI, 
Book I, Pages 153-154.) 
In this case Lenin asked nothing more of the "civil and 
military chiefs" among the "ruling" petty-bourgeois democratic 
parties than that they take power and assure "really full freedom 
of propaganda." Returning to this question again on ' October 9, 
1917, he wrote: 
"Our business is to help do everything possible to secure the 
'last' chance for a peaceful development of the revolution, to help 
this by !presenting our programme, by making clear its general, na-
tional character, its a'bsolute harmony with the inter,ests and demands 
of an enormous 'majority 'of th~ population." (Lenin: Collected Works. 
-Vol. XXI, Book I, Pa'ge 257.) 
Thus, Lenin proposed .to fight "the civil and military chiefs'" 
in three different ways, according to the circumstances, on three 
different occasions - by "extermination," by "arrest," ,and bv 
"peaceful propaganda." All were equally revolutionary. The o~­
casions and the circumstances in each case were different. Lenin 
took. such variations into account and changed his proposals ac-
cordingly. He never made a strait-jacket out of his tactical for-:-
mulas. N either should ' we - if we want to be genuine Leninists. 
That "force is the midwife o~ every old society pregnant with 
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the new" - this is an axiom known to every student of Marxism. 
It is wrong, to entertain or disseminate illusions on this score, and 
we did not do so at the trial. But it is a great mistake to conclude 
from this that violence and the talk about violence serve the revo-
lutionary vanguard advantageously at all times and under all con-
ditions. On the contrary, peaceful conditions and democratic legal 
forms are most useful in the period when the party is still gather-
ing its forces and when the main strength and resources, including 
the resources of violence, are on the other side. Lenin remarked 
that Engels was "most correct" in "advocating the use of bourgeois 
legality" and saying to the German ruling class in 1891: "Be the 
first to shoot, Messrs. Bourgeois!" 
Our party 'which must still strive to get a hearitng frolll the 
as yet indifferent working class of America has the least reason 
of all to emphasize or to "advocate" violence. This attitude is 
determined by the present stage of class development and the re-
lation of forces in the United States; not, as M unis so generously 
assumes, by our exaggerated concern for a "light sentence." As 
a matter of fact the question of violence was giv~n ten times more 
proportionate mention in our testimony at the trial than it has 
been given in the propaganda columns of our press during the 
past ten years, including the voluminous contributions of Conlrade 
l"rotsky. 
Expressing disdain for our repeated painstaking explanations 
"about who initiates the violence," and our "general tone" which, 
he says, "makes one feel embarrassed at times," M unis offers us 
"proud valor"- as a substitute. Had we been gifted with this rare 
attribute we should have said, according to Munis: "The workers 
and farmers should respond to the daily violence of the poor mass-
es. We do not predict, but rather 'we assure, we ask, we advocate 
temporary violence of the majority against the permanent organic 
'Violence of the reactionary minority." 
We don't know much about "proud valor" and had no need 
J()f it; we did not appear at the trials as posturing actors but only 
;as party' militants with a practical political task to carry out. N a-
turally, it is a good thing for a revolutionary militant to have 
()rdinary human courage enough to take those risks which are 
implicit in the struggle against capitalism. And we can add: He 
should also have enough prudence to avoid unnecessary sacrifices. 
The lack of either of these qualities can be a serious personal de-
ficiency. .But the posses~ion of both, and in good working order 
at that, sttll does not suffice to answer the most important questiol! 
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f t· at the trial' namely what formulations, what tone, con ron lng us " . b 
h h · on the question of Violence could est serve our w at emp aSlS . . h' _ 
d the ulven condItIons? The answer to t e questIon cause un er b· 
must be political, not theatrical. . . . . . 
L nin unquestionably burned WIth IndIgnatIon and hatred for 
the op~ressions of the people and ~new about the ,:iole~ce of all 
kinds that is inse?arabl~ from a regtme ?,f c1as,~ domInatIon .. Also, 
while it is quite ImpossIble to s~eak of valor t? say nothIng; of 
"proud valor," in connect~on WIth th~ unpretentIous an? m.atter-
of-fact Lenin - such knIghtly grandIloquence would fIt hIm as 
oddly as a silk hat - there _ is evidence. that he had ner:e e.nough 
to fill his post. Lenin 'was the most stIff-necked rebel In hIstory. 
But his approach to the question of violence, as to every other 
question, was determined by political considerations. He did not 
by any means employ one universal formula and one kind of em-
phasis such as M unis prescribes for us. Indeed, he was far less 
"radical" in his formulations for the propaganda of the Bolshevik 
party in the months, and even the weeks, directly preceding the 
victory than is Munis in his demands on our party which at the 
time of the trial could only be described properly as a small and 
isolated propaganda group. 
It is most revealing to read how the great master of revolu-
tionary strategy, returning to Russia after the March revolution, 
developed the work of mobilizing the masses around the Bolshevik 
party by means of propaganda. The Bolshevik party grew by leaps 
and bounds, but nevertheless remained a minority for many months. 
It should be instructive to any "violence" fanatic to see how Lenin, 
under these conditions, persistently tried to shove the question. of 
violence into the background and to ward off a premature test 
of strength. Even as late as October 9, as we have seen, he was 
offering "to help do everything possible to secure the 'last' chance 
for a peaceful development of the revolution." When he finally 
called for action it was for mass action and there was no theatrical 
bluster about it. The Bolshevik party, thanks to its preliminary 
prop~ganda work, had the mass force to carry the action through 
to VIctory. 
On Apri125 he protested in Pravda against "dark insinuations" 
of "Minister N ekrasov" about "the preaching of violence" by the 
Bolsheviks: 
"Mr. Minister. worthy mem·ber of the 'People's Freedom Party' 
you are lying. It is Mr. Guchkov who pr,eaches violence when h~ 
threatens to pUnish the soIdier~ for removing the authorities. It 
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is the Russkaia Valia, the pogrom newspaper of the pogrom 're-
publicans' and friendly to you that preaches violence. 
"The Pravda and its followers do not preach violence. On 
the contrary, they declare most clearly, precisely, and derinitely, 
that our main work should at present he concentrated on e:cplaining 
to the -proletarian masses their 'proletarian 'Problems, as distinguished 
from the problem-s of the petty bourgeoisie which has succumbed 
to -chauvinist poison." (Lenin: Collected Works - Vol. xx, Book 1, 
Page 171.) 
On May 4 the Central Committee of the party adopted a reso .. 
lution written by Lenin. The aim of this resolution was to restrain 
the Petrog,rad local leadership 'which was running ahead of events; 
to put the ((responsibilityJ) for any violence on the "Provisional 
Government and its supporters"; and to accuse the "capitalist mi-
nority" of reluctance to submit to the will of the majority." Here 
are the two paragraphs from the resolution: 
'"'I. Party agitators and s.peakers must refute the despicable 
lies of the capitalist -papers and of the papers supporting the 
capitalists t-o the effect that we threaten with civil wa,.. This Is 
a despicable lie, for at the 'present moment, when the ca.pitaUsta 
and their government cannot and dare not use violence against 
the masses, when the mass of soldiers and workers freely ex-
pr.esses its will, freely elects and replaces all pu1>lic of ricers, - at 
such a moment any thought of civil war is naive, senseless, mon· 
strous; at such a moment there ·must be full compliance with the 
will of the majority of the population ' and free criticism . of this 
will by the dissatisfied minority; should violence be resorted to, 
the responsibility will fall on the Provisional Government and its 
supporters. 
"2. The government of the capitalists and its newspapers, by 
their noisy denunciation of the alleged civil war, are only trying 
to conceal the reluctance of the capitalists, who admittedly con-
stitute an insignifieant minority of the t)eOlple, to submit to the 
will of t-he majority." ('Lenin: Collected Works - Vol. XX, Book 1, 
:Page 245.) 
Doesn't this sound surprisingly like "the lamentable dialogue 
(lbout who initiates the violence" concerning which Munis so haught-
ily protests? Indeed, the similarity is not accidental. Our formula-
tions did not fall from the sky. We had taken the trouble to read 
Lenin, not in order to memorize his words bu.t to learn the essence 
of his methods of approaching and mobilizing the masses while 
the Bolsheviks remained in the minority. 
On May 5 the Central Committee of the Bolshevik party, fight-
ing against enemy provocations on the one side and revolutionary 
32 
I 
impatience in ~e part~ ranks ~n the other, .adopted anoth~r r~so­
lution on LenIn's motIon. It IS 'worth readIng over ten tImes by 
any comrade who may be impressed by light-~ind~d talk about 
"action" by a party which lacks the necessary mass support for 
action. The resolution says: 
"The slogan, "Down with the Provisional Government,' .is at 
the vresent moment not sDund, 'because such a slogan, unless there 
is a solid (Le., a class conscious and organized) m,ajority of the 
people on the side of the revolutionary proletariat, is either a mere 
phrase, or, objectively, reduces itself to encouraging efforts of an 
adventurous nature." (Lenin: Collected Works - Vol. XX, Book 1, 
Page 254.) 
If these ideas are correct, and we believe they are, then it is 
certainly reasonable to conclude that the Socialist Workers Party 
in the United States has some long., hard days of propaganda work, 
of patiently explaining, ahead of it. By such means · it must secure 
a mass support before it can afford the luxury of much talk about 
action. Lenin drew these conclusions for the Bolshevik party, and 
laid down precise instructions accordingly, only six months befo-re 
it was to become the majority. The same resolution says in another 
paragraph: 
"The slogans of the moment ar,e: (1) El~cidation of the prole-
tarian 'policy and proletarian method of terminating the war; (2) 
criticisrn of the petty-bourgeois policy of confidence in and agree-
ment with the capitalist government; (3) propaganda and agitation 
from group to group, within each regiment, in each .factory, par-
ticularly amongst the most backward masses, servants, unskilled 
labourers, etc., for it is mostly on them that the bourgeoisie tried 
to 'base itself during the days of the crisis; (4) organisation, or-
ganisation and once mMe organi8(1,tion of the prDl,etariat: in each 
factory, in each district, in each block." (Lenin: Colleeted works-
Vol. XX, Book 1, Page 255. Our emphasis.) 
On May 6, still hammering at irresponsible violence-mongers, 
the greatest leader of revolutionary action, who believed in fi'rst 
U explaining" and ((convincing" and (''Winning over the tnajority/' 
wrote: 
"Crises cannot be overcome by the violence of individuals 
against other individuals, by partial ri-sings of small groups of 
armed -people, 'by Blanquist attempts to 'seize power,' to 'arrest' 
the Provisional Government, etc. 
"The slogan of the day is: Explain more carefully, more clearly, 
more broadly the proletarian poUcy, the proletarian method of 
terminating the war." (L.enin: Collected Wor,ks - Vo1. XX, Book 1, 
Pape 259.) 
Marxism, without a doubt, is the doctrine of revolutionary ac-
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tion. But is has nothing. in common with "violence of individuals/' 
"partial risings of small groups," or any other form of "action" 
wherein individuals or minorities attempt to substitute themselves 
for the masses. In other words Marxism is not anarchism or Blan-
quism ,; it wages irreconcilable war against such tendencies. The 
revolutionary action which Marxism contemplates is the action of 
the masses, of the proletarian majority, led by the vanguard party. 
But this action, and the party's leading role in it must be, and can 
only be, prepared by propaganda. That is the central lesson of the 
development of the Bolshevik party after the March revolution and 
the eventual transformation of its slogans from propaganda to 
action. That was Lenin's method. It was less romantic than that 
of impatient people who dream of short cuts and miracles to be 
evoked by the magic word "action." But, in compensation, Lenin's 
method led to a mighty and victorious mass action in the end. 
A party which lacks a mass base, which has yet to become 
widely known to the workers, must approach them along the lines 
of propaganda, of patient explanations, and pay no attention to 
impatient demands for "action" which it is unable to organize and 
for exaggerated emphasis on "violence" which, in the given con-
ditions, ,can only react to its disadvantage. When one considers 
how persistently careful and even cautious~ was Lenin's party to 
avoid provocation and cling to its formula of peaceful prO'paganda 
while it remained a minority, the merest suggestion that our party, 
at the present time, with its present strength, take a "bolder" course 
appears utterly fantastic, like a nightmare separated from living 
reality. Lenin wrote: 
''The government would Uke to-see us make the first reckless 
step towards decisive action, as this would be to its advantage. It 
is ,exasperated because our party has advanced the slogan of peace-
ful demonstration. We must not cede one iota of our princivles to 
the watchfully waiting petty ,bourgeoisie. The proletarian party 
would -be guilty of th~ most grieVious error if it shaped its policy on 
the -basis of subJective desires where organisation is required. We 
cannot assert that the majority is with us; in this .case our motto 
should be: caution, caution, caution." (Lenin: Collected Works -
Vol. XX, Book 1, Page 279.) 
From the foregoing it should be clear that our disavowal of 
'~responsibility" for violence in the testimony before the court at 
Minneapolis was not a special device invented by us "to reconcile 
the jury," as has been alleged; our formulation of the question, 
taken from Lenin, was designed to serve the political aims of our 
movement in the given situation. We did not, and had no need to, 
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disregard legality and "advocate" violence as charged in the In-
dictment. 
But neither did we represent ourselves as pacifists or sow 
pacifist illusions. Far from it. We. elucidate~ the. question of vio-
lence and the socialist transformatIon of sqc1ety In the same way 
that our great teachers, who organized a revolution, elucidated it. 
More than that, we gave a sufficiently frank and precise justifica-
tion of the defensive violence of the workers in the daily class 
struggle this side of the revolution. The court record bulges with 
proof that we had indeed advocated the organization of Workers 
Defense Guards. The testimony goes further-and this is a not 
unimportant detail - and reveals that we translated the word into 
deed and took a hand in the actual organization and activities of 
Defense Guards and picket squads when concrete circumstance 
made such actions possible and feasible. 
We are not pacifists. The world knows, and the prosecutor in 
our trial had no difficulty in proving once again, that the great 
I\1inneapolis strikes, led by the Trotskyists, were not free fronl 
violence and that the workers were not the only victims. We did 
not disavow the record or apologize for it. When the prosecutor, 
referring to one of the strike battles in which the workers came 
out victorious, demanded: "Is that Trotskyism demonstrating it-
self?" he received a forthright answer. The court record states:l 
"A: Well, I can give you my own opinion, that I am mighty 
proud of the fact that Trotskyism had some part in influencing the 
workers to protect thems.elves against that sort of violence. 
"Q: Well, what kind of violence do you mean? 
irA: This was what the deputies were organized for, to drive 
the workers off the street. They got a · dose of their own medicine. 
I think the workers have a right to defend themselves. ' If tha.t 
is treason, you can make the most of it." (.Socialism on Trial, Page 
113.) 
With this testimony we said all that needs to be said on the 
question of violence in ~he daily class struggle, as in the previously 
quoted testimony we said enough about violence and the transition 
to socialism. I f this method of presentation did not help the pro-
secutor, we can say again: That was not our duty. If it is objected 
that. even. in this example of the Minneapolis strike, dealing; with 
an IndubItable case of working-class violence we insisted on its 
defensive nature, we can only reply: In reai life the difference 
bet:ve~,n . careful de~ensive formulation and light-minded "calls for 
act~on IS usually, 1n the end result, the difference between real 
actton and mere talk about it. 
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4. Is It Correct to Say We Prefer a Peaceful 
Transition? 
Our repeated insistence at the trial that we prefer a peaceful 
transition to socialism, and that we resort to violence only as a 
defensive measure, brings objection and ridicule from our critic. 
HWhy not," says Munis - "why not ask forgiveness, besides, for 
seeing ourselves painfully obliged to employ violence against the 
bourgeoisie?" It is possible that others may regard our formulation 
as lacking in aggressiveness and militancy but, being; more indulgent 
than Munis, pass it off as a legal euphemism, justifiable under the 
circumstances. To be sure, our formulation helped our position 
from a legal standpoint and we did not hesitate to emphasize it in 
this respect. Also, in our opinion, the declaration that we, the 
rrrotskyists, prefer a peaceful change of society, is a good propa-
ganda approach to the democratic-minded American workers. 
These two considerations are very important, but we are quite 
ready to agree that they would not justify the use of a false or 
hypocritical statement, or a statenlent contradicting principle. 
We were guilty of no such dereliction. Our formula in this 
case also is the formula of the Marxisf teachers. They not only 
insisted on the desirability of a peaceful change of society, but in 
certain exceptional circumstances, considered such a peaceful revo-
lution possible. We, on our part, rejected any such prospect in the 
United States, but at the same time declared our preference for it 
and accused the ruling: bourgeois as the instigators of violence. In 
this we were completely loyal to Marxist doctrine and tradition. 
On the witness stand at Minneapolis we mentioned the opinio'~ of 
~1arx and Engels in regard to England in the 19th century. Here 
is the exact quotation from Engels: 
'~Surely, at such a moment, the voice ought to be heard of a 
man whose whole theory is the result of a life-long study of the 
economic 'history and condition of England, and whom that study 
led to the conclusion that, at least in Europe, England is the only 
country where the inevitable social revolution might be effected 
entirely by peaoeeful and legal means. He certainly never forgot to 
add that he hardly expected the English ruling class,es to submit, 
without a 'pro-slavery r,ebellion,' to this peaceful and legal revolu· 
tion." (Engels: Preface to Marx's Capital, Vol. I - Kerr Edition, 
Page .32.) 
We should have added that the conditions of England in 
Marx's time exist no more and therewith his calculation is out of 
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date and no longer applicable. At any rate, we made this clear 
with regard to the United States.." . . 
In "Terrorism and CommunIsm, a book aImed from begIn-
ning to end at the bourgeois-democratic fetishism of Kautsky, Trot-
sky defended the violence of the proletarian revolution as a weapon 
forced upon it by the violence of the counter-revolutionary bour..:. 
geoisie; never did he renounce a preference for the peaceful way. 
In his introduction to the Second English Edition, published in 
England under the publishers' title, "In Defense of Terrorism,'" 
he explains the position as follows: 
"From the Fabians we may hear it objected that the English 
proletariat have it quite in their own hands to come to power by 
way of Parliament, to carry through peacefully, within the law and 
step by step, all the changes called for in the ea.pitaUst system, and 
by so doing not only to mak.e revolutionary terrorism needless, but 
also to dig the ground away under the feet of counter-revolutionary 
adventurers. An outIo-ok such as this has at first sight a particular 
persuasiveness in the light of the -Labour Party's very important 
successes in the elections - ,but only at first sight, and that a 
very superficial one. The Fabian hope must, 1 fear, be held from 
the very beginning to be out of the question. 1 say '1 fear,' ,inoe 
a peaceful, parliamentary change over to a new social !tructu,.. 
would. undoubtedly offer highly iwportant aavantages from t'Ne 
standpoint of the interests of culture, and therefore those of .0-
cialism. But in politics nothing is more dangerous than to mistake 
what we wish for what is possible." (Trotsky: Introduction to 
Second English Edition of "In Defense of Terrorism," Page v. Our 
emphasis.) 
We tried to say the same thing at the trial in our own words 
and in our own way, suited to the circumstances. 1n this classic 
formulation of the question, the legal and propagandistic advan-
tages of our "preference for a peaceful transition" fall into their 
proper place beside, and subordinate to, the most weighty consider-
ations of all: "The interests of culture, and therefore those of 
'socialism.' , 
, Trotsky, again, in his introduction to the book on "The Living 
'1 houghts of 1VIarx," foretold a violent revolution for the United 
States, but he did not neglect to place the blame on the ruling class 
and express a different preference. Said Trotsky: 
"It would be best, of cours,e, to achieve this purpose in a peace-
ful, gradual democratic way. But the social order that has outlived 
itself never yields its 'place to its successor without r~sistance." 
(Page 33.) 
Lenin, as has been shown heretofore, denied the accusations 
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of Bolshevik responsibility for violence so often that more than 
one critic of that revolutionary time, 'sick with radicalism and im-
patient for "action," might well have reproached him for the "eu-
phemistic, sweetened character" of his statements and taunted him 
with the ironical query: "Why not ask forgiveness, besides?" How-
ever that may be, Lenin, preparing the greatest mass action in 
history by means of propaganda, insisted right up to the end that 
be preferred the peaceful road. 
On October 9-10 he promised support to the Soviets "in every 
way" if they would but assume power and thus secure a peaceful 
development: 
"Th,e proletariat will stop before no sacrifices to save the revo-
lution, which is impossible without the programme set forth above. 
On the other hand, the proletariat would support the Soviets in 
every way if they were to make use of their last chance for securing 
a peaceful development of the revolution." ('Lenin: Collected Works 
- Vol. XXI, Book 1, Page 264.) 
In the same article he maintained that even at that late day 
the Soviets had the possibility - "probably their last chance" - to 
secure a peacef~l development: 
uHavin·g seized 'Power, the Soviet could still at pres.ent - and 
this is probably their last chance - secure a peaceful development 
of the revolution, 'peaceful ,elections of th~ deputies -by the people, 
a peaceful struggle of parties inside of the Soviets, a testing of 
the programmes of various parties in practice, a peaceful passin-g 
of lpower from one -party to another." (Lenin: Collected Works -
Vol. XXI, Book 1, Pages 26-3-264.) 
As late as September 29 he contended that in Russia, under 
the unique conditions which he cited, "an exceptional historic mo-
ment," a peaceful transformation was even probahle: 
"The 'Peaceful development of any revolution is, generally speak-
ing, .an extremely rare and difficult thing, for a Tevolution is the 
maximum sharpening of the sharpest class contradictions; but in 
a peasant country at a time when a union of the ;proletariat with 
the peasantry ron give peace to the masses that are worn out b,. 
a most unjust and criminal war, when such a union can give the 
peasantry all the land, in such a -country, at such an ~xceptional 
historic moment, a peaceful development of the revolution is possible 
and probable if all power !passes to the Soviets. Within the Soviets 
the struggle of parties for power may 'Proceed peacefully, with the 
Soviets fully democratised, with 'petty thefts' and defrauding of 
democratic principles eliminated - such as giving the soldiers. one 
representative to eyery five hundred, while the workers have one 
representative t<> every thousand voters. In a democratic republic 
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such petty thefts are doomed to disappear." (Len"ln: Collected 
Works - Vol. XXI, Book 1, Pages 237-23'8.) 
Trotsky, in his "History," has explained this strategy of the 
Bolsheviks which was untainted by the fetishism of violence: 
"The transfer of power to the soviets meant, in its immed1&te 
sense, a transfer of lpower to the Compromis,ers. That might have 
been accomplished peacefully, by way of a sim'Ple dismissal of the 
bourgeois government, whiehhad survived only on the good will 
of the Compromisers and the relics of the confidence in them of 
the .masses. The dictatorship of the workers and soldiers had been 
a fact ever since the 27th of February. But the workers and soldiers 
wer,e not to the point necessary aware of that fact. They had con-
fided the power to the Compromisers, who in their turn had passed 
it over to the ,bourgeoisie. The calculations of the Bolsheviks on 
a peaceful development of the revolution rested, not .on the hope 
that the bourgeoisie would v:oluntarily turn over the ·power to. the 
workers and soldiers, but that the workers and soldiers would in 
good season prevent the eompromisers fro·m surrendering the power 
to the bourgeoisie. 
"The concentration of th~ 'power in the soviets under a regime 
of soviet democracy, would have opened ,before the Bolsheviks a 
complete opportunity to become a majority in the soviet, and con-
sequently to create a government on the ·basis of their program. 
For this end an armed insurrection would have 'been unnecessary. 
The interchange of ,power between parties could have been accom-
plished peacefully. All the efforts of the party from April to July 
had be,en directed towards making possible a peaceful development 
of the revolution through the soviet. 'Patiently explain' - that 
had been the key to the Bolshevik ,policy." (Trotsky: History of 
the Russian Revolution - Vol. II, Pages 312-3'13.) 
These words of the two greatest leaders of Marxism in action 
should have an instructive value for all revolutionary militants. 
Lenin's sincere and earnest talk about a "peaceful development of 
the revolution"; his offer to "make compromises" to assure "the 
la.st chance" for it; Trotsky's summary statement that the "key 
to the Bolshevik policy" had been the simple prescription: "patient-
ly explain" - in all this it is shown that Lenin and Trotsky were 
completely free from radical bombast about violence. But in re-
turn, they organized a victorious proletarian revolution. 
. And they had prepared so well that the transfer of power did 
Indee~ take place in Petrograd without any large-scale violence. 
We dId not falsify the historical fact at the trial when we said 
there was "just a little scuffling., that's all." (Socialism on Trial, 
Page 64.) The violence came afterward, initiated by the "pro-
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slavery .rebellion" which was eventually crushed by the m~ss force 
of the people led by the .Bolshevik party. These impressive facts 
give the explanations and formulas of Lenin and Trot~ky a certain 
authority for those who want to be Marxists. 
5. "Submitting to the Majority" 
Comrade M unis is dissatisfied with our assertions at the trial 
that "we submit to the majority." The Oehlerites also are scornful 
of this declaration and represent it as some kind of capitulatory 
repudiation of our principles in order to impress the jury. All 
these assumptions are without foundation. Our "submission to the 
li1ajority" was not first revealed at the trial. We said it before 
the trial and continue to repeat it after the trial. It is a correct 
statement of our position because it conforms both to reality and 
necessity. Moreover, our Marxist teachers said it before us; we 
learned it from them. 
What else can we do but "submit to the majority" if we are 
Marxists, and not Blanquists or anarchist muddle-heads? It is 
a timely occasion to probe into this question because we believe 
any . ill-considered talk about some kind of mysterious "action," 
presumed to be open to us while we remain not only a minority, 
but a very small, numerically insignificant minority, can lead only 
to a dang.erous disorientation of the party. An exposition of the 
Marxist position on this question can also be useful as an antidote 
for any remnants of the half-Blanquist tradition of the early years 
of the Comintem in America. 
The pioneer communists in the United States (and not only 
here) heard of the Bolshevik victory 'in Russia long before they 
learned about the political method and propaganda techniques 
vvhereby the Bolsheviks gained the mass support which made the 
seizure of power possible. Their first impressions were undoubt-
edly colored by the capitalist press accounts which represented the 
revolution as a coup If etat engineered by a small group. This dis-
torted conception was epitomized by the title given to the American 
edition of Trotsky's classic pamphlet, "Terrorism and Commun-
ism," which was published here by the party's publishing house in 
1922 under the completely misleading title: "Dictatorship versus 
Democracy ." We took the "dictatorship," so to speak, and gene-
rously handed over to the bourgeoisie all claim to "democracy." 
This was far too big a concession, perhaps pardonable in a 
young: movement lacking adequate knowledge about the democratic 
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essence . of the Bolshevik ·program, but by far out " of date to4ay. 
The bourgeoisie have always trie~ to picture communi$m as. ~ 
"criminal conspiracy'~ in order to alienate the worker~ ~ho are 
profoundly "democratic i? th~ir sentiments. That was the ~im . onc.~ 
again in the Minneapohs trIal. It was our task ~t . ~he tr~al to go 
Gut of our way to refute this misrepresentation and emphasize the 
democratic basis of our program; ~ot in order to placate our ene-
Inies and persecutors, as is assumed, but in order to reveal th~ 
truth to our friends, the American workers. " 
We cannot eat our cake and have it too. We must either "sub-
nlit" to the majority and confine ourselves to propaganda designed 
to win over the majority - or, we must seize power, more correct-
ly, try to seize power and break the neck of the party, by minority 
"action." 
Marxist authority is clear and conclusive in choosing between 
these alternatives. When we ' took our stand in court regarding 
"submission" to the majority we were not "folding our arms" and 
making; "opportunistic" statements of "passivity in the face of the 
Imperialist war," as we are accused. Nothing of the sort. The 
testimony states, repeatedly, and with sufficient emphasis, that, 
while "submitting to the majority" - that is, making no minority 
insurrections or putsches - we are organizing, speaking, writing~ 
and "explaining"; in other words, carrying on propaganda with 
the object of winning over the majority to our prog.ram, which is 
the program of social revolution. 
N either were we simply trying t9 "make an honorable im-
pression on the jury without taking into consideration that we 
should talk for the masses." .To be sure we did not stupidly 
disregard the jury which held the fate of 28 comrades, not to 
rr.lention the legality of the party, in its hands. But we were speak-
ing also, and especially, "for the masses." We testified primarily 
for publication. It was our deliberate aim to convince those who. 
would read the testimony in printed form of the truth that the 
proletarian movement which we aspire' to lead is a democratic 
nlovement, and not a "conspiracy," as the prosecutor and the whole 
vf the capitalist press would picture it, and as loose talkers would 
unconsciously aid them to so picture it; not a scheme to transfer 
~ower ~rom one clique to. another, but a movement of the majority 
In the Interest of the majority. " 
In additi?n, it may as. well be said candidly that this testimony 
V';-as also delIberately deSIgned as an educational shock to such 
members and sympathizers of our movement as may still, at this 
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late day, be dabbling with the idea of a shorter cut to socialism by 
some mysterious prescription for "action." 
The Marxist authorities have all spoken in one voice on this 
question. 
The Cotnmunist Manifesto, the first, and the most fundament-
al statement of the principles of scientific socialism, defined the 
proletarian movement of emancipation, in contradistinction to all 
others in history, as follows: 
"All !previous historical movements w.ere movements of minorities, 
or in the interest of minorities. The 'proletarian movement is the 
self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in 
the interest of the immense majority." 
The communist political method and strategy follow ineluc-
tably from this basic premise. Nowhere and never have the author-
itative representatives of Marxism formulated the question other-
wise. The Marxists aim to make the social transformation UJith 
the majority and not for the majority. The irreconcilable struggle 
of Marx and Engels against the Blanquists revolved around this 
pivot. 
In 1895, summing up the experience of fifty years, Engels 
Vlrote, in his Introduction to Marx' "Class Struggles in France": 
. "The time of surprise attaiCks, of revolutions carried through by 
small conscious minorities at th.e head of the unconscious mas·ses, is 
,past. Where it is a question of a complete transformation of th.e 
social organisations, the masses themselves. must also be in it, must 
themselves already have gras'ped what is at stak,e, :what they are 
·going in !for (with body ana soul). The history of the last fifty years 
has taught Us that." (The Class Struggles in France, by Karl Marx-
Marxist Library, Vol. XXIV, Page 25). 
The successors of Marx and Engels followed in their foot-
steps. The experiences of the Russian revolution confirmed in life 
the basic premise of the founders of scientific socialism. It was 
precisely because Lenin and Trotsky had assimilated this concept 
into their flesh and blood that they knew how to concentrate their 
whole activity on propaganda to 'Win over the majority, biding their 
time till they gained the majority, and resorting to "action" only 
.;when they felt assured of the support of the majority. 
What did they do in the meantime? They u sub1nitted to the 
majority/' What else could they do? Lenin explained it a hundred 
times, precisely in those months and days when the Bolsheviks 
were consciously preparing the struggle for power. In his "April 
Theses" on "The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revo-
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lution," published in Pravda on April 20, 1917, a few days after 
his return to Russia, Lenin wrote: 
"As long as we are in the mInority we carryon the work of criti-
cising and exposing errors and at the same time advocate the necessity 
of transferring the entire power of state to the Soviets of WorkeTIS' 
Deputies, so that the masses may 'by experience overcome their 
mistakes." (Lenin: Selected Works-Vol. V[, Page 23.) 
A few days later, he returned to this q~estion, explaining the 
reason for this attitude, the reason being that "we are not Blan-
quists, we are Marxists." On April 22 he wrote: 
"In order to obtain the power of state the class conscious workers 
must win the majority to their side. .As l()ng as no viQlence is used 
against the masses, there is no 'Other road to power. We ar,e not 
Blanquists, we are not in favour of the seizure of power ,by a minor-
ity. We are Marxists, we stand tfor a ipl"oletarian class struggle 
against chauvinist def,encism., llhr3iSes, and dependence on the 
bourgeoisie." (Lenin: Selected Works-Vol. VI, Page 29.) 
Not once or twice, but repeatedly and almost continually, so 
that neither friend nor foe could possibly misunderstand him, 
in the months directly preceding the ' October revolution, Lenin 
limited the Bolshevik task to the propaganda work of "criticizing," 
uexposing. errors" and "advocating" in order to "win the majority 
to their side." This was not camouflage for the enemy but edu-
cation for the workers' vanguard. He explained it theoretically 
a s we, following him, tried to explain it in popular language at 
the trial. 
Again, in April 1917, refuting the accusations of Plekhanov 
and others who accused the Bolsheviks of "anarchism, Blanquism, 
and so forth," Lenin once again explained the question, for the 
benefit, as he said, of "those who really want to think and learn." 
Into a few paragraphs he compresses a profound thesis which 
every member of the workers' vanguard ought to learn by heart. 
He wrote: 
"I a'bsolutely insured myself in my theses against skipping over the 
still existing peasant m'ov,ement, or the ,petty-bourgeois movement in 
general, against the workers' government playing at the 'seizure ot 
power,' against any kind of Blanquist adventurism; for I directly 
referred to the experience of the Paris Commune. And this experi-
ence, as we know, and as was shown in detail by Marx ,in 1871 and 
by Engels in 1891J absolutely excluded Blanquism, absolutely ensur~d 
the direct, immediate and unconditional rule of the majority and 
the activity of the masses, but only to the extent of the oonscious and 
intelligent action of the majority itself. 
"In the theses I definitely redu~d the question to one of a strug· 
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gle for influen.ce within the 'Soviets of Workers' Agricultural La· 
bourers', Soldiers' and Peasants' 'Deputies. In order to leave no trace 
of doubt in this respect, I twice 8IIl1Phasized in the theses the necessity 
for patient and ~rsistent 'explanatory' work 'adapted to the practi-
cal needs of the 'mJ(],8ses.' 
"Ignorant persons or renegades from Marxism, such as Mr. Plek-
hanov, may cry anarchism, Blanquism, and so forth. 'But those who 
really want to think and learn cannot fail to understand that Blan-
quis·m means the seizure of power by a minority, wh,ereas the Soviet 
of Workers', A:gricultural Labourers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies 
are admittedly the direct and immediate organisation of the majorit1l 
of the 'P,eople. Work confined to a struggle for influence within 
these Soviets cannot, absolutely cannot, blunder into the swamp of 
Blanquism. Nor can it ,blunder into the swamp of anarchism., for 
anarchism denies the necessity for a state and. jor state power in the 
period of transition from the rule of the bourgeoisie to the rule of the 
'proletariat, whereas I, with a precision that excludes all possibility of 
misunderstanding, insist on the necessity for a state in this period, 
although, in accordance with Marx and the experience of t~e Paris 
Commune, not the usual parliamentary bourgeois state, but a state 
without a standing army, without a police opposed to the people, 
without an officialdom placed above the people." (Lenin: Selected 
Works-Vol. VI, Pages 37-38.) 
Again explaining wherein "Marxism differs from Blanquism" 
-he obviously considered it absolutely necessary for the advanced 
workers to understand this so as to be sure of their ground at 
every step-he wrote in a letter to the Central Committee of the 
party on September 26-27, 1917: 
"To be successful, the uprising must be based not on a conspiracy, 
not on a party, :but on the advanced class. This is the first point. 
The uprising must be based on the revolutionary upsurge of the 
people. This is the second !point. The uprising must be based on the 
crucial point in the history of the maturing revolUtion, when the, 
activity of the vanguard of the people is at its height, When the 
vacillations in the ranks of the enemies, and in the ranks of the weak, 
half-hearted, undecided friends 01 the revolution are at their highest 
point. This is the third point. It is in pointing out thes,e three 
conditions as the way of approaching the question of an uprising, 
that Marxism differs from Blanquism." (Lenin: Collected Works-
Vol. XXI, Bo~k 1, Page 224.) 
Naturally, when Lenin, or any other Marxist, spoke of the 
necessity of the revolutionary party having the support of the 
majority he meant the real majority whose sentiments are ascer-
tainable in various ways besides the ballot box of the bourgeois 
state. On the eve of the insurrection he wrote his ' devastating 
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ttack on Zinoviev and Kamenev who opposed the insurrection :n the ground, among other things, that "we do not enj~:>: a ~ajor­
ity among the people, and in the absence of that conditlon Insur-
rection is hopeless." 
Lenin, in "A Letter to the Comrades," written on October 
29-30 scornfully dismissed the authors of this statement as "either 
distorters of the truth or pedants who desire at all costs, without 
the slightest regard for the true circumstances of the revolution, 
to have a guarantee in advance that the Bolshevik Party throughout 
the country has received exactly one half the number of votes 
plus one." Nevertheless, he took pains to prove the Bolsheviks 
had the majority by "facts": "The elections of August 20 in Pe-
trograd". .. "The elections to the Borough Dumas in Moscow in 
"Th I' h S ." "Th September". . . e new e ectlons to t e OVIets. . . e ma-
jority of the Peasants' Soviets" who had "expressed their op-
position to the coalition" ... "The mass of the soldiers". . . "Fi-
nally ... the revolt of the peasantry." He concluded his argument 
on this point by saying: "No, to doubt now that the majority 
cf the people are following and will follow the Bolsheviks is 
shameful vacillation." 
Once again disavowing Blanquism, he wrote in his polemic 
>2.gainst Zinoviev and Kamenev: 
"A military conspiracy is Blanquism it it is not organized 'by the 
party of a definite class; it itS' organizers have not reekoned with the 
poUtical situation in general and the international situation in par-
ticular; 't the party in question does not enjoy the sympathy of thp 
majority of the people, as proved by definite facts. . . ." (Lenin: Se-
lected Works-Vol. VI, Pages 321-322.) 
On September 25-27 Lenin called upon the Bolshevik party 
to take power. In this famous letter, addressed "to the Central 
,Committee, the Petrograd and Moscow Committees of the Russian 
Social-Democratic Labor Party," Lenin, with the logic and direct-
,pess which characterized him, states his premise and his conclusion 
in the first sentence: . 
"Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of W.()rkers' and{ Sol .. 
diers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take 
power into their hands." 
He was not worried about a "formal" majority; "no revolu-
tion . ev~r waits for this.}} But he was sure of the real majority. 
He InsIsted upon the revolution "right now," as he expressed it, 
not sooner and not later, because: 
"The majority of the people is with us. This has 'been proven by 
the long and difficult road from May 19 to August 12 and September 
45 
2·5: the majority in ' the Soviets of the capitals is the result of the 
people's \progress to our siae. The vacillation of the Socialist-Revo-
lutionarLes and Mensheviks, and the strengthening of internationalists 
among them, is proof of the same thing." (Lenin: Collected Works-
Vol. XXI, Book 1, Page 221.) 
The prosecution. at the Minneapolis trial attempted to convict 
us, as charged in the indictment, of an actual "conspiracy to over-
throw the government by force and violence." We successfully 
refuted this accusation, and the indictment covering this point 
was rejected by the jury. The most effective element of our re-
fntation of this absurd charge against our small party was our 
exposition of the democratic basis of the proletarian program, 
of the party's reliance on the majority to realize its program, and 
its corresponding obligation, while it remains in the minority, to 
"submit to the majority." In making this exposition we had a 
legal purpose, but not only a legal purpose, in mind. As with all 
the testimony, it was designed primarily to explain and simplify 
'our views and aims to the workers who would be future readers 
of the published court record. 
We also thought a restatement of the Marxist position in this 
respect would not be wasted on the members of our own movement, 
and might even be needed. The discussion which has arisen on 
this question only proves that we were more correct in this latter 
assumption than we realized at the time. Socialism is a democratic 
movement and its program, the program of the vanguard party, 
can be realized only with the support of the majority. The party's 
basic task, while it remains in the minority, is "propaganda to 
win over the majority." To state this was not capitulation to the 
prejudices of the jury; it is the teaching of Marx and Lenin, as 
has been shown in the foregoing references. 
6. Marxism and War 
Our insistence at the trial that we undertake revolutionary 
action only with the support of the majority and not over their 
heads has brought a criticism also in connection with our attitude 
toward war, but this criticism is no more valid than the others and 
has no more right to appeal to the authority of Lenin. 
Comrade M unis quotes with sharp disapproval the following 
answer to a hypothetical question concerning what our attitude 
would be in the event of the United States entering the war (this 
was before the declaration of war) : 
"A decision has been made, and is aecepted by the majority of the 
people, to go to war. Our comrades have to comply with that." 
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Mums widens the gap between his understanding of revolu-
tionary policy and ours by strongly o~ecting to this, as it appears 
to us, obviously correct and necessary statement. H.e says: 
"1:'n t~ first place, the d·ecision to go to war has not 'been made 
and accepted by a majority of the people.' This statement can be 
criticized very strongly, a statement that we would censure very 
energetically If it w,ere made by a centrist. In place of accusing the 
government of leading the American people to the slaughter against 
the will of the majority, instead of accusing it emphatically before the 
masses and of demonstrating to them 'how the parliamentarian majori-
.ty acts against the majority of the lPeople, Cannon endorses Roose-yelt's 
decision as if it really corresponded to the majority of the people." 
This impassioned rhetoric contains neither logic, nor Leninism, 
nor understanding of my statement, nor an answer to it. "In the 
first place," I didn't ((endorse Roosevelt's decision, as if it really 
corresponded to the " majority of the people." I said, "the decision 
(hypothetically) is accepted by a majority of the people," the de-
cision which has been ((made" by others, for obviously one does 
not "accept" a decision which he has made himself. But that is 
only a small point which illustrates that the testimony was care· 
lessly read before it was even more carelessly critic~zed. * 
In the essence of the matter, the majority do in fact accept 
and support~ either actively or passively, the "decision to go to 
war." This is an incontestable fact, as shown by the complete 
absence of mass opposition. It is this attitude of the majority 
which we have to contend v;ith. The fact that the decision was 
made by others does not help us. It is the attitude of the masses 
toward the decision that we must contend with. 
What can and what should we, as Leninists, do while the 
masses maintain their present attitude? - that is the question. 
To make our position clear it is necessary to complete the answer 
given in the testimony which Munis broke off in the middle. He 
* From similar careles'Sness in reading the testimony, Munis blithely 
represents us as "asking the expulsion from the party of the militants 
who organize protests in the army," and of "disauthorizing agitation and 
protests in t~ army." On the .contrary, we defended the right of such 
agitation and protests, as a not too ha:sty reading of the testinwny will 
convince anyone who is interested. What we "disauthorize" is futile 
and suicidal individual "acts of insubordination and obstruction by mem-
bers of our small party, acts whic'h could only isolate them from the 
soldier mass under the given conditions and operate against the aim of 
Winning over the majority. That is not the same thing as "dlsauthor-
lzing agitation and protests in the army." 
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stops with our statement that ·"our comrades have to 'comply" 
without adding the sentences which ' explain what is · meant by 
"compliance." Here are the ex'planatory sentences .: 
"Insofar as they are eligible for the draft, they must aecept that, 
along with the rest of their generation, an:d go and lperform the ;duty 
imposed on them, until such ti'me as they convince the '/fIUJ,jor'J,tll tor (J 
different policy." 
When the quotation is restored in full text it begins to look 
somewhat different than Munis hastily pictured it. It is nothing 
rrlore or less than a warning; to individual workers of the vanguard, 
who may be drafted, to "go with the rest of their generation" and 
not waste their energy and militancy on individual resistance, 
refusal of military service, etc. Was this warning correct? And 
was it necessary? As to the correctness of the warning, from the 
standpoint of Leninism, it will suffice to give two authoritative 
quotations. The first is a representative extract from Lenin's 
writings during the first W or ld War: 
"The idea of refusing to serve in the army, of strikes against the 
war, etc., is mere foolishness, it is the miserable and cowardly dream 
of an unarm.ed struggle against an armed bourgeoisie, it is a weak 
y.earning for the abolition of capitalism without a desperate civil war 
or a series of wars." (Lenin: Collec~ed Works - Volume XVIII, 
Page 88.) 
The second quotation is from the fundamental theses, "War 
and the Fourth International": 
"If the proletariat should find it beyond its power to prevent war 
by means of revolution,-and this is the only means of preventing war, 
-the workers, together with the whole people will be forced to 
participate in the army and in the war." (Page 33.) 
This truth is presumably known to all revolutionists. But it 
was not always known. During the first W orId War many of the 
Lest proletarian militants in the United States knew no other way 
to express their principled opposition to the imperialist war than 
by individual resistance to conscription, objection to and refusal 
of military service, etc. Much precious energy and courage were 
wasted that way. In testifying before the court, with a view to 
the publication of the testimony, we assumed that rank and file 
\vorker militants, to whom Lenin's tactics are as yet unknown, 
might read and be influenced by this warning; to "accept" with 
the masses - "until such time as they convince the majority for 
a different policy." Our words were primarily directed to them. 
We were not even dreaming either of "endorsing Roosevelt's 
decision" or of having to defend this ABC formulation within 
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our . own movement. We simply intended to say, in words and 
tone which we thought most efficacious from a propagandistic 
standpoint in the situation, what Lenin said in February 1915: 
"What should the Belgian Socialists have done? Since they could 
. not accomplish a social revolution together with the FrenCh, etc., 
they had to submit to the majorif'V of the, nation at the present mo-
ment and go to war .... 'Citizens of B,elgium! ... W,e are in the 
minority; I submit to you and go to war, but even in the war I shall 
preach; I shall ,prepare the civil war of the proletariat of all countries 
because outsid,e of it there is no salvation for the peasants and work-
ers of Belgium and of other countries!'" (Lenin: Collected W'Orks-
Vol. XVIII, Pages 115-116. Our emphasis.) 
Lenin, you see, "submits to the majority." While he is in 
the minority, what does he do? He "preaches" and "prepares." 
If this policy "can be criticized very strongly," then let the crit-
icism be directed against Lenin. He is the author of the policy. 
We learned from him. 
Munis quotes a sentence in the testimony: "We would not 
support the war in a political sense." Now, this single sentence, 
even standing by itself, is perfectly correct. But Munis is greatly 
dissatisfied with it. 
"Why, then, equivocate so dangerously?" he asks. "I see no other 
reason ·but that our comrades have committed th.e very grave error 
of talking for a :pettY-'bourgeois jury for the more immediate present, 
not foreseeing the future struggles. Would it not have b,een better to 
state: 'Wb submit to your war, American bourgeois, because the 
violenc.e of your society imposes it on us, the material violence of your 
arms. But the masses will turn against you. From today on, our 
'party is with the masses in an irreconcilable struggle against your 
regime of oppression, misery and butchery. Therefore we will fight 
'against your war with all means.'" (Our emphasis.) 
This agitational substitute for the position we elucidated at 
the trial is false from beginning. to end, as we shall demonstrate. 
The testimony explains what we mean by "political opposi-
tion" : 
" 'A: By that we mean that we do not give any support to any 
imp,erialist war. We do not vote for it; · we do not vote for any person 
that l}romotes it; we do not speak for it; we do not write for it. We 
are in opposition to it." (Socialism on Trial, page 47.) 
A declaration of war by the United States Government would 
not change our position: 
"Q: If the United States should enter into th.e European conflict, 
what form would the opposition of the Party take to the war! 
"A: We would maintain our position. 
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"Q: And that is what, 
44A:: That is, we would not become supporters of the war, even 
after the war was de,clared. That is, we would remain an opposition 
political party on the war question, as on others. 
"Q: You would not support the war? 
"A: That is what I mean, we would not support the war, in a 
political sense." (ISociaUsm on Trial, Page 48.) 
Under cross-examination by the prosecuting attorney the po-
sition was made more emphatic and precise: 
"Q: And you will seek to utilize war, during the war, to destroy 
the pres.ent form of Government, will you not? 
"A: Well, that is no secret, that we want to change this form 
of ·government. 
HQ: ~nd you look forward, do you not, to the forthcoming war 
as the time when you may be able to accomplish that? 
"A: Yes, I think the forthcoming war will unquestionably 
weaken the imperialist governments in all countries. 
~'Q: You said, I believe, that you will not support the war! 
You do not believe in National Defense at all, do you? 
"A: Not in imperialist countries, no. 
"Q: I am Slpeaking of this country? 
"A: I believe 100 Iper cent in defending this country by our 
own means, but I do not believe in defending the imperialist govern-
ments of the world-
U,Q: I am speaking about the Gov,ernment of the United States 
a;s , it is now constitutionally constituted. You do not believe in 
defending that. do you? 
"A: Not in a political sense, no. 
"Q: You do not 'believe in defending it in any sense, do you? 
I"A': I explained the other day, if the 'majority of the people 
decide on war, and partf.cipat~ in the war, our people and the people 
under our influence will also participate in the war. W~ do not 
sabotage the war, w.e do not obstruct it, but we continue to prQlPagate 
our ideas, calling for a cessation of the war and calling ;for a change 
in government." (S()ciaUsm on Trial, Page 106.) 
When Mr. S~hw~inhaut, ' pursuing the question to the very 
end, introduced the summary paragraph of the War Manifesto 'of 
the Fourth' International, he was answered by an affirmation of 
that document which was completely devoid of any "alnbiguity" 
or "inexactness": 
"Q: Now, o'n June 29, 1940, the Socialist Appeal published this 
from the report of the Manifesto of the Fourth International: ~Inde­
, , pendently of the course of the war, we fulfill our ,basic task: We 
explain ,to the work€rs the irreconcilability betw.een their interests 
and the interest of bloQd-thirsty 'capitalism; we mobilize the toilers 
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against imperialism; w:e .propagate the unity of the workers in all 
warring and neutral countries; we call for the fraternization of work-
ers and soldiers within each -country, and of soldiers with soldiers on 
the opposite side Q1f the battle front; we mobilize the women and 
youth against the war; we carryon constant, !persistent, tireless 
preparation of the revolution-in · the factories, in tb,e mills, in the 
villages, in the barracks, at the front and in the fleet.' You want the 
soldiers to do that, don~t you 1" 
"A: Yes, I think that is a summation of the idea, for the soldiers 
and ev~rybody to do that. That is the way to .put an end to this 
slaughter." (Socialism on Trial, Page 111.) 
In the face of these quotations from the court record one is 
reasonably entitled to ask: What does Comrade M unis want of us? 
What more needs to be said before the capitalist court, or in a 
popular propagandistic exposition anywhere? N either Lenin nor 
Trotsky, to ' judge by their own writings, would demand more 
of our party. . 
Trotsky, who was an internationalist to his heart's core, ex-
plained that a socialist party, which was in the minority at the 
outbreak of the first World War, was required to and could only, 
take up a position of politicaJ opposition until such time as "the 
change in the feeling of the working masses came about." That 
is the way he expounded the problem in "War and the Internation-
al." This book, written during; the first World War and published 
in the United States under the publisher's title, "The Bolsheviki 
and World Peace," is one of the classics upon which our move-
~ent has been raised and educated. Trotsky wrote: 
"The advance guard of the Social 'Democracy feels it is in . the 
minority; its organizatioruJ, in order to complete the organization of 
the army, are wrecke~. , Under such conditions ther.e can be no 
thought of a revolutionary move on the part _of the Party. And all 
this is quite independent of whether the people loo~ upon a particular 
war with favor or disfavor. In spit.e of the colonial chara-cter of the 
Ru.sso-Japanese war and its unpopularity in Russia, the first half 
year of it nearly s'mothered the revolutionary movement. Consequently 
it is quite clear that, with the b~st intentions in the world, the Socialist 
.parties canp.ot pledge themselves to obstructionist action at the 'time 
of , mobilization, at :a time, that is, when ' Socialism is more than eV,er 
politically iso~ated,. ' 
~'And therefore there is nothing particularly unexpected o~ dis-
, eouraging in the fact that the working-class ,parlles ' did not oppose 
military mobilization with their own revolutionary mobilization. Had 
- the Socialists Umi-ted ,themselves to ,expressing condemnation' of the 
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present War, had they d'eclined all responsibility for it and' refused 
the vote of -confidence in their .governments as well as the vote for 
the war credits, they would have done their duty at the time. They 
would have taken up a po.sition of waiting, the oppositional character 
of which would have :been ,p:erfectly clear to the government as well 
as to the people. Further action would have been determined by the 
march of events and by those changes which the .events of a war 
must produce on the Ip;eople's consciousness. The ties binding the 
International together would have 'been pr:eserved, the })anner of 
Socialism would have been unstained. Although weakened for the 
moment, the Social ,Democra:cy would have pres.erved a free hand fQr a. 
decisive interference in affairs as soon as the change in the feelings 
of the working masses came about.'t (Th,e Bolsheviki and World Peace 
-,Pages 175-177.) 
The .sa~e idea was explained over again by ,Trotsky twenty-
two years later in his testimony . before the Dewey Commission 
in 1937. lIe still prescribes "political opposition" as a ~evolutionary 
method. At that time France had a military alliance ' with the 
Soviet Union · and he was asked ·'the hYPDtheticq,l question by StDl-
berg: ' . . 
' -'~You are a responsible revolutiona,ry figure. Russia and France 
already have a military alliance. Suppose an internatiOOlalwar 
breaks out .. ~ Wp.at w·ould you say to the French working class iil 
reference to the defeils.e' of the .Soviet Unlon? 'Change the French 
bourgeoi:s g~v:ernment,' would you say?" 
Trotsky's answer is especially interesting to us, si~ce the 
United States .today stands in the pDsition of France of 1937 in 
relation to' the Soviet U nion~ and the hypothetical war has become 
a reality ~ 
"This question is more or less answered in the the~es, 'The 'War 
and the Fourth International,' in this sense': In France I would 
remain in opposition to th.e Government and would develop system-
atieally this opposition. In Germany 'I would do anything I could to 
sa'botage the war ·machinery. They are two different things. In 
Germany and in Japan, I would apply military methods as far' as I 
am able to fight, oppose, and injure the machinery, the militarY ' ma-
chinery of Japan, to disorganize it, both in Germany and Japan. In 
France, it· is political opposition against · the bourgeoi'sie, and the 
pre.paration of the proletarian revolution. Both are revolutionary 
methods. But in Germany and Japan I have as illy immediate aim 
.th.e disorganization of th~ whol~ machinery. In France, I l1ave the 
.aim of the proletarian revolution." (The Oase of Leon Trotsky, Pages 
_ 289-2.90.l 
In his ;"April Theses;". ··which . is -a 'sufficiently -authoritative 
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document, since it was the program for the revolutionary struggle 
of the Bolsheviks in Russia under conditions of war, Lenin thought 
it enough, in dealing with the question of war and the governmen4 
to say: "not the slightest concession must be made to 'revolutionary 
defensism' " ; "No support must be given to t4e Provisional Gov-
ernment" because it is "a government of capitalists"; power must 
be transferred to the Soviet; and then to add: 
"In view of the undoubted 'honesty of the mass of the rank-an41-
file believers in revolutionaTY d,efensism, who ac.cept the war as ~ 
necessity only and not as a means of conquest; in view of the faCt 
that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary 
thoroughly, persistently and patienltly to explaJ.n · their error to 
them." (Lenin: Selected Works, Vol. VI , Pages 21-22.) . 
Political opposition ("No support to the Provisional ' Gove~n:" 
ment") and propaganda ("patiently explain") - these are the 
\veapons with which Lenin and Trotsky prepared ·' and finally 'car-
ried through the proletarian revolution. They win suffice for us 
too. Our propagandistic explanations of our war · policy . in the 
Minneapolis court room are neither "opportunistic" 'nor "equivocaL" 
'fhey contain the essence of the teachings and practice of Lenin 
and Trotsky. 
The alternative formulas of Comrade Munis, however, . con:,. 
tain one error after another. According to him, we should have 
said: 
"We submit to your war, American bourgeois, because -the 
violence of your society imposes it upon us, the material violence 
uf your arms." 
That is not correct. If that were so we would have no right 
tc condemn acts of individual resistance. When militant workers 
are put in fascist prisons and concentration camps because of their 
socialist opinions and activities they submit,. but only through cqm-
pulsion, to "the material violence of arms." ·Consequently, indi~ 
viduals or small groups are encouraged and aided to IIdesert," to 
make their escape whenever a favorable opportunity presents it-
self, without waiting for and without even consulting the majority 
of the other prisonefis in regard to the action. The revolutionary 
n10vement gains by such individual '''desertions'' because they can 
restore the prisoner to revolutionary effectiveness which is largel) 
shut off in prison. Trotsky, for example, twice "deserted" from 
Siberia without incurring any criticism from the revolutionists. 
Compulsory military service in war is an entirely .different 
fDatter. In this ca,se .we submit primarily ~o the majority Qf the. 
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workers who accept and support the war either actively or passively. 
Since we cannot achieve our socialist aims without the majority 
we must go with them, share their hardships and hazards, "and 
win them over to our side by propaganda on the basis of commori 
experiences. To accept military service under such circumstances 
ic; a revolutionary necessity. Individual resistance, objection, de-
.sertion, etc. in this case - directly contrary to that of prisoners 
escaping from "the violence of arms'" - constitute desertion of 
class duty. The party, which applauds and aids the escaping pris-
ener, . condemns draft dodgers and deserters: The escaped prisoner 
frees " . himself to resume revolutionary work. The individual de-
serter from the military service cuts himself off from the mass 
who have to make the revolution and thereby destroys his value. 
, "From today on," Munis would have us say, "our party is 
with the masses in an irreconcilable struggle against your regime 
of oppression, misery and butchery. Therefore we will fight against 
your war with all means." 
The regime of the bourgeoisie is here justly described. The 
rest of it is incorrect and contradictory; it "skips a stage" in the 
t:volution of the attitude of the masses toward the war, and pre-
cisely that. stage which must be the point of " departture . for our 
propaganda - the present stage. To say to the bourgeoisie, "The 
masses will turn against you" in the future, means only that they 
have not yet done so. It cannot logically be followed by the asser-
tion, "from today on, our party is with the masS'e's in an irrecon-
cilable struggle, etc." . 
/ The masses today} thanks to all kinds .of compUlsions and de-
ceptions, and . the perfidious role of the labor bureaucracy and the 
renegade socialists and Stalinists, are acceptingi and supporting 
the war, that is, they are acting with the bourgeoisie and not with 
us. The problem for our party is, first, to understand this primary 
fact; second, to take up a position of ({Political opposition)); and . 
then, on that basis, to seek an approach to the honestly patriotic 
workers and try to win them away from the bourgeoisie and over 
to our side by means of propaganda. That is the only "action" that 
is open to us, as a small minority, at the present time. 
. It .is also incorrect to say "we will fight against your ,var 
with all means." While we are in the minority we fight with the 
Marxist weapons of political opposition, criticism and propaganda 
for ;:t workers' program and a workers' government. We reject 
the pa~ifist "means" of abstention, the anarchist "means" of in-
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dividual sabotage and the Blanquist "me'ans" of minority insur-
rection, the putsch. 
It would appear that M unis' erroneous explanation of tfie 
primary reason why a minority revolutionary party "submits" to 
the war, his tendency to skip a stage in the workers' development 
and his lack of precision in speaking of the struggle against the 
war by "all means" - these errors lead him to slide over to equally 
loose and ill-considered formulations as to those means of struggle 
which are open, and advantageous, to the minority party of revo-
lutionary socialism. 
7. Marxism and Sabotage 
The everlasting talk about "action," as if a small mihority 
party has at its disposal, besides its propaganda - its "explan-
ations" - some other weapons vaguely described as "actions" but 
not explicitly defined, can only confuse and becloud the question 
and leave the door open for sentiments of an anarchistic and Blan-
quist nature. We, following all the Marxist teachers, thought it 
necessary to exclude such conceptions in order to safeguard the 
party from the danger of condemning itself to futility and destruc-
tion before it gets a good start on its real task at this time: to 
explain to the masses and win over the majority. 
That is why we utilized the forum of the trial to speak so 
explicitly about ou~ rejection of sabotage. That is why we denied 
all accusations in thi"s respect so emphatically. Not - ,:with Munis' 
permission - for lack of "valor," but because, as Marxists, we do 
not believe in sabotage, terrorism, or any other device which sub.-
stitutes the actions of individuals or small groups for the action 
of the masses. , 
There can be no two positions on this question. , Marxist 
authorities are universal on one side - against sabotage as an in-
<;!ependeJ).t means of revolutionary , struggle. This "weapon" belongs 
i~ the arsenal of anarchism. 
Sabotage was once the fashion in this country - 'in the polit-
ically primitive days before the first W orId War. Imported from 
France where it was advertised, as a miraculous remedy by the 
anarchists and anarcho-syndicalists, sabotage was taken up by the 
I.W.W., the left socialists, and the radical intellectuals, who in 
those days had a decidedly anarchistic hue . . It seemed for a time 
to offer a wonderful short cut to victory for a movement which 
wasn't doing so well with the humdrum job of educating 'and 'or-
ganizing the workers for mass action. ' 
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The consequences of this anarchistic folly were disastrous for 
the LW.W. The advocacy of sabotage only repelled the masses 
and left the LW.W. members in a legally indefensible position. 
To avoid complete alienation from the workers, and for sheer 
self-preservation of the organization in the face of prosecutions 
during the war, the LW.W. was compelled to drop the "weapon" 
of sabotage overboard with the most unseemly haste. 
Those who have memories of this unhappy experience, es-
pecially those who, as participants in the American syndicalist 
movement, burned their fingers on this hot poker, will be least 
of all inclined to play with the idea of sabotage again. Sabotage' 
is not the slogan of proletarian power and confidence but of petty-
bourgeois futility and despair. 
The fundamental theses, "War and the Fourth International," 
state categorically: 
"'Individualistic and anarchistic slogans of refusal to undergo 
military service, passive resistance, desertion, sabotage are in basic 
contradiction to the methods of the proletarian revolution." (War and 
the Fourth International-Page 33. Our emp·hasis.) 
Lenin wrote: 
"Not the sabotaging of .the war, not . undertaking s·poradic indi· 
vidual acts in this direction, but the conducting of '11UJ8's propaganda 
(-and not only among 'civilians') that leads to the transformation of 
the war into civil war .... W.e do not sabot(J){Je the 'War, 'but we 
-struggle against chauvinism. . . ." (Lenin: Collected Works, Vol. 
XVIIiJ, Page 74. Our emphasis.) 
Munis is especially indignant at our rejection of sabotage in 
the testimony, but he is wrong in his criticism and wrong even, 
it w'ould appear, ' in his understanding of the question: 
"The defendants," he says, "saw themselves forced to condemn 
; sabotage in general, as though it dealt with something criminal." 
Again: -
"For moments there is evidence that the defendants really con-
sider sabotage a crime. If I am mistsk€n-and I hope I am:-this is 
a dangerous moral predisposition." 
To that we can only answer with the French expression: "It 
is worse than a crime - it is a blunder." As to the "moral" as-
pect of the question - that does not exist for us. Our consider-
ations in this respect are exclusively political. 
Of course, if one wants to discard precision of definitions and 
dump everything into one ' pot loosely described as "actions," dis-
re.garding proportion, circumstance, and the relation between ac-
tions w'hich are primary and fundamental and those ,vhich are 
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subordinate and au%iliary - in that case we can argue endlessly 
in a closed circle. But Marxism abhors vagueness of expression; 
it calls things by their right names - precisely. 
Sabotage, to us, means individual acts of obstruction and de-
.. truction, substituted for mass action. That is the way Marxism 
defines it and, thereby, condemns it. Similarly, individual terror-
ism. But it is necessary to understand that such actions have one 
quality when employed as substitutes for mass action and another 
quality when subordinated to and absorbed by mass action. Marx-
ism is opposed to terrorist assassinations, for example, but not 
to wars of liberation waged by the oppressed masses, even though 
\<\lars entail some killing of obnoxious individuals. So, also, with 
acts of obstruction and destruction as part of and subordinate to 
wars waged by the masses, not as substitutes for them. "Terror-
ism" and "sabotage" are then no longer the same things. Every-
thing changes, including the attitude of Marxists, according to 
what is dominant and what is subprdinate in the circumstances. 
Thus, if it is argued that Trotsky, in his answer to Stolberg, 
a~ked for sabotage of the military machinery in Germany and 
japan, it must be pointed out that his proposal was made only in 
the event of war against the Soviet Union. Then sabotage in Ger-
nlany and Japan would be not an independent revolutionary action 
but a secondary military measure of support to the mass action 
of the Red Army. Trotsky never asked for sabotage as a means 
of overthrowing a fascist or any other type of bourgeois regime 
from within. 
Comrade Munis seems to invest sabotage with a virtue in its 
own right. We, on the other hand, admit "sabotage" only ' as a 
minor auxiliary factor in mass actions; that is, when it is no 
longer sabotage in the proper sense of the term. The difference is 
quite fundamental. 
M unis writes: "I believe that sabotage is a method for tactical 
use whose application at certain moments can be productive of 
contrary effects to what is intended." (Our emphasis.) 
This/ is putting the question upside down. Sabotage produces 
4'contrary effects," not once in a while but always, when it is em-
ployed by itself as a substitute for mass action; like all anarchistic 
methods it tends to disorganize and demoralize the mass movement 
which alone can bring us to socialism through the proletarian re-
volution. M unis' formulation, contrasted to that of Trotsky in his 
article, "Learn to Think," shows a great difference of conception. 
1· rotsky wrote: 
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"The proletarian party does not resort to artificial methods, such 
as ·burning warehouses, setting off bombs, wrecking trains, etc., in 
order to bring about the defeat of its own government. 'E;ven if it 
w,ere successful on this road, the military defeat would not at all 
lead to revolutionary success, a success whi-ch can be assured only 
'by the inde.pendent movement of the proletariat .... 
"The m·ethods of struggle change, of course, when the struggle 
enters the o.penly revolutionary phase. Civil war is a war, and in 
this aspect has its :particular laws. In civil war, ,bombing of ware-
houses, wrecking of trains and all other forms of military 'sabotage' 
are inevitable. Their appropriateness is decided 'by 'purely mil.itary 
considerations-civil war 'Continues revolutionary tpolitics but by 
other, precisely, ·military means." (Trotsky: Learn to Think, The New 
Int.er~ational, V;()l. IV-~o. 7, Page 207.) 
Sabotage is admissible as a weapon of. the proletarian move-
ment only "in quotat~on marks" as elucidated by Trotsky. That 
is) when, strictly speaking, it is no longer sabotage, but a Ininor 
military . measure supplementing mass action. Whoever speaks of 
sabotage in any other framework does not speak the language of 
~1arxism. 
8. 'Defensive Formulations a-nd .the 
Organization of Action 
In general, it may be said that the · source of all the criticism ' 
of our expositions at the Minneapolis trial is to be found in the 
apparent rejection of defensive formulations, and in cQunterposing 
"offensive action" to them. But the essence of the whole question 
consists in this, that defensive formulations prepare and help ·· to 
create genuine mass actions, while "calls to action," not so pre-
pared, usually echo in the void. It . is not by accident that those 
revolutionists who understand this are precisely the ones .who have 
shown the capacity to organize actions when the conditions for 
them are present. The ultra-left sectarians, meantime, who do not 
understand the best mechanism for the organization of actions -' 
that is, .precisely, defensive formulations - always remain alone 
and isolated with their impatient slogans and their self-imagined 
intransigeance. 
. Our critics explain our resort to defensive formulations by 
the theory that our strateg.y in court was determined above all by 
concern to obtain light sentences. "Our comrades ... try tcf make 
an honorable impression on t~e j ury withou~ taking into consider- . 
ation that they should talk for the masses." We seem to "have 
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one policy for the masses and another for appearances before ~ 
bourgeois judge." 
However, this appraisal of the motives of the defendants, 
which falls short of flattery, is somewhat contradicted by the fact 
that we immediately published the testimony in our press and 
then republished it in thousands of copies in pamphlet form, "for 
the masses." We do not deny anyone the right to his opinion as 
to the moral content of our conduct at the trial, and we do not 
i!ltend even to debate the question on that ground. In this domain 
"actions speak louder than words." But we shall attempt a polit-
ical exposition, basing ourselves on Marxist authority, of the role 
of defensive formulations in the organization of proletarian mass 
action. 
Also, defensive formulations are an indispensable medium 
for teaching the masses, who will not be convinced by theory but 
only by their own experience and propaganda r~lated thereto. 
This experience of the masses proceeds in the main along the line 
of defensive actions. That is why defensive formulations are most 
easily comprehensible and represent the best approach of the re-
volutionary Marxists to the masses. Finally, it is a tactical and 
legal consideration of no small importance in a bourgeOis-demo-
cratic country that defensive formulas partially disarm the class 
enemy; or in any case, make their attacks more difficult and cost-
ly. Why should such advantages be thrown away? 
Defensive formulations retain their efficiency in all actions 
involving masses, from the most elementary economic strikes to 
the open struggle for power. Those' who aspire to organize action 
ought to know this. ' 
. American economic strikes have been ' explosively violent, and 
the violence has not all been on one side. The institictivemilitancy 
of the workers, as revealed in these strikes, would indicate that 
vlhen the time comes for grandiose revolutionary actions, these' 
same workers will remain true to their tradition and not be para-
lyzed by Quakerism. _ -
Every str,ike leader ,worth his salt knows, however, that strik-
ers are not mobilized and sent into action against strike-breakers, 
thugs and law-breaking cops by lecturing them on the virtues ,of 
violence and "calling" them to take the "offensive." The workers, 
militant and courageous as they may be, prefer victory by peaceful 
'means; and in this they only show good sense. In addition strikers, 
at the beginning, almost invariably entertain illusions about the 
itnpartiality of the public authorities and tend to assume that they, 
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as well as the bosses and their hirelings, will respect the rights 
of the strikers and the Justice of their cause. 
They need experience, which as a rule is soon forthcoming, 
to change their attitude and move them to militant action. They 
need also some assurance that legal right is on their side. Strike 
leaders wno seek not self-expression but victory in the strike, who 
understand that it can be won only by means of mass solidarity 
and mass action, must take these illusioris and sentiments of the 
workers into account as the point of departure. Strike leaders can 
in no case begin with loose-mouthed "calls" for violent offensive 
action 'of the strikers. The first task is to explain the implacable 
nature of the struggle in . W~ich the self-interest of the bosses ex-
cludes fair play, .and the role of the public authorities as political 
servants of the bosses; the. second task is to warn the workers 
to expect violent attacks; and the third task is to prepare and organ-
Ize the workers. to defend the'mselve~ and their rights. Along these 
lines, and as a !ule only along these lines, ,the .struggle can be con-
~ciously developed ' in tempo and scope. The most e~fective mass 
action of the ;' st,rikers,as eyery experienced organizer of mass 
actions knows, is organized and carried out under defensive slogans. 
Matters an~' no different when the workers' mass action ' as-
c.ends ,from the elementary field.of th~ economIc strike to the top-
most peak of the class s,truggle - the open fight for political 
power. H 'ere also the action proceeds under defensive slogans 
and, to a very large extent, also under cover of legality. Trotsky 
has demonstrated this so convincingly in his monumental "History 
of the Russian Revolution," that there remains no ground for 
serious debate in our ranks on the subject. To the student it should 
be sufficient to say: There is the book; go and read it. To the 
critic who imagines, without having thought the matter out, that 
defensive formulations signify squeamishness, or hedging on prin-
ciple, 'we say and we shall prove: That is the way the Great Rus-
sian Revolution was organized and carried through to victory. 
Here is the way Trotsky explains the question: 
HTh'e attacking side is almost always interested in seeming on 
the -defensive. A revolutionary party is interested in legal coverings. 
The coming Congress of Soviets, although in essenc.e a Soviet of 
revolution, was neverthel'ess for the whole ,popular m·ass indubitably 
endowed, if not with the whole sovereignty, at lea-st with a good half 
of it. It was , a question of one of the elements of a dual power 
making an insurrection against the other. Appealing to the Congress 
as the source of authority, the ' Military Revolutionary Committee 
'accused . the g~vern~~t i~ a9vance of .preparing an. attempt against, 
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the soviets. This aceusation flowed logically from the whole situa-
tion. Iusofar as the government did not inten<L to capitulate without 
a fight it could not help getting ready to defend its,elf. But by this 
very fact it became liable to the accusation of conspiracy against the 
highest organ of th~ workers, soldiers and -peasants. In its struggle 
'against the Congress of Soviets which was to overthrow Kerensky, 
the government lifted its hand against that source of power from 
which Kerensky had issued. 
"It would, be a serious m.istake to regard all this as juridicaJ 
hair-splitting of no interest to the people. On the contrary, it was ita 
j ust this form that the fundamental facts of the revolution re/lectetJ 
them.selves in the minds 01 the masses." (Trotsky: History of the Rus-
sian Revolution-Vol. III, Page 279. Our emphasis.) 
Again: 
, "~though an insurrection can win only on the offensive, it de-
velqP8 better, ,th,e more it loo.ks lik~ self-defense. A piece of official 
sea1ing-wa~ ~n ,the door of the Bolshevik ~ditorial rooms-as a miU-
,t,ary ,measure t~at is not ,'m,uch. But what a superb signal. for ,bat· 
tIe!" (Trotsky: History of the ,Russian Revolution-Vol. III, Pages 
207-208.) 
On the night of the victorious insurrection the Bolsheviks 
'accused th~ official government as ," conspi~a:t<?rs" ' making an 
Jlassault" which had to be ', forcibly resisted: , 
4'Teiephono~aJ;llS ' to all districts ,' and units of the garrison an-
nounced the event: 'The enemy of the -people took the offensive during 
the night. The Military R,evolutionary Committee is leading the 
resistance to the assault ()f the , conspirators.' The conspirators-
these were the ,institutions of the official gov.~rnment. From the pen 
of revo,lutionary conspirators this term came as a ,surprise, but it 
'Yholly , corresponded to th~ situation and to the f.eelings of the mas-
ses.'~ , (Trotsky: History of the Russian Revolution-Vol. Ill, Page 
208.) , 
This accusation was broadcast to the whole country. The 
insurrection ' was justified as a reply to the "offensive" of the 
enemy: 
"The sailor Kurkov has remembered: 'We got word from Trotsky 
to broadcast ... that the counter.;r,evolution had taken the offensive.' 
Here' too the defensive , formulation concealed a summ()ns to - insur-
rection addressed to, the whole country." (Trotsky: History of the 
Ru:ssian Revolution-Vol. III, Page 208.) 
At every step, as the struggle unfolded and neared its climax, 
the Bolsheviks clung to their defensive formula, not as a' petty 
,..c.e<;eption but because that is the way the issue appeared to the 
workers and soldiers. Even at a caucus of Bolshevik delegates to 
the Soviet .Congress, held on October 24, that IS, th.e day of the 
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insurrection, they still found it necessary to retain the "defensive 
envelope of the attack." Says Trotsky: 
"There eouldbe no talk of .expounqing before this caucus the 
whole-plan of the insurrection. Whatever is said at a large meeting 
inevitably gets abroad. It was still impossible even to throw off the 
d-efensive envelope of the attack without creating confusion in the 
minds of certain units of the garrison. But it was necessary to make 
the delegates. understand that a decisive struggle had already ·begun, 
and that it would remain only for the Congr.ess to crown it." (Trotsky: 
History of the Russian Revolution.-Vol. III, Page 211.) 
On October 23, the day before the insurrection, an all-city 
conference of the Red Guard was held in Petrograd. The resolu-
tion adopted by the conference, says Trotsky: 
"defined the Red Guard as 'an organization of the armed forces 
of the proletariat for the struggle against counter-revolution and th,a 
defense of the conquests of the revolution! Observe this: that twenty-
four hours before tne insurrection the task was still defined in terms 
of defense and not attack." (Trotsky: History of the Russian ~volu­
tion-Vol. III, Page 18'8.) 
Naturally, being Bolsheviks, their H defense" .had nothing in 
common with the policy of folded arms. They were prepared for 
eventualities but they never gave up the advantage of "seeming on 
the defensive." Trotsky . spoke at the caucus of Bolshevik delegates 
on the 24th: 
"Referring to recent articles of Lenin, Trotsky demonstrated that 
'a conspiracy does not contradict the .principles of Marxism,' if object-
ive relations make an insurrection possible and . iil;evita'ble. 'The 
physical barrier on the -road to power must .be overcome .by· a blow ... .' 
However, up till now · the policy of tne Military Revolutionary Com-
mittee has not .gone beyond the policy of self~defense. Of course this 
self-defense must be understood in a sufficiently 'broad sense. To as-
sure the publication of the Bolshevik press with the help of armed 
forces, or to retain the Aurora in the waters of the Neva-'Comrades, 
is that not self-defense?--!It is defenseP If the government intends 
to arrest us, we have machine guns on the .roof of Smolny in prepa· 
ration for such ~n event. 'That also, comrades, is a meaJ!lure ot 
defense.'" (Trotsky: History of tne Ru&sian Revolution-Vol. III, 
Pages 211'-212.) 
Trotsky painstakingly explains how the . October revolution 
was developed by defensive formulations from link. to link over 
a period of thirteen or sixteen days during which "hundreds of 
thousands of workers and soldiers took direct action, defensive in 
form, but aggressive in essence." At the end of that time, the 
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masses being fully mobilized, there remained "only a rather narrow 
i'roblem"-the insurrection, the success of which was assured. 
"The October revolution can be correctly understood only if you 
do not limit your field of vision to its final link. IDuring the last days 
of February the chess game of insurrection was played out from the 
first moye to the last-that is to the surrender of the enemy. At the 
end of October the main part of the game was already in the past. 
And on the day of insurrection ·it remained to solve only 3.! rather 
narrow .problem: mate in two moves. The period of revolution, there-
fore, must be considered t'O extend from the 9th of October, when the 
conflict aoout the ,garrison began, or from the 12th, when the 
resolution was passed . to create a Military Revolutionary Co~mittee. 
The enveloping maneuver extended over mo.r,e than two weeks. The 
more decisive ,part of it lasted five to six days-from the birth of the 
Military Revolutionary Committee to th.e capture of the Winter 
·Palace. DUring this whole period hundreds of thousands of workers 
and soldiers took direct action, defensive in form, but aggressive in 
essence. The final stage, when the insurrectionaries at last threw 
off the qualifications of the dual power with its dubious legality and 
defensive phr8JSeology, occupied ' emctly twenty-four hours: from 2 
o'clock on the night of the 25th to 2 o'clock on the night of the 26th." 
(Trotsky: History. of the RWlsian . Revolution~Vo~. III, Page 294.) 
Up to the decisive moment the Bolsheviks not only insisted on 
the defensive form of their actions; they also held onto Soviet 
legality "of which the masses were extremely jealous." It must 
have been a shock to Mr. Schweinhaut, the government prosecutor 
at the Minneapolis trial, when we defended the "legality" of the 
Octobeli revolution. He, like many others, imagined that Bolsheviks 
disdainfully cast aside such trifles as legal justifications even when 
they are available. The prosecutor must have been still more dis-
com fitted when we proved the legality . of the revolution under 
cross-examination. And we were not dissimulating. Trotsky 
explained this question also in his refutation of Professor Pokrovsky 
who had attempted to make fun of the ( ~legalistic" contentions of the 
Bolsheviks. Trotsky would not let such arguments pass even in 
the guise of jesting remarks. He answered: 
"Professor Pokrovsky denies the very importance of the alternative :: 
Soviet or party. Soldiers are no formalists, he laughs: they did not: 
need a Congress of .soviets in order to overthrow Kerensky. With an~ 
its wit such a formulation leaves uneXI>lained the problem: Why 
create soviets at all if the party is enough? 'It is interesting,' con-
tinues the professor, 'that nothing at all came of this aspiration to d() 
everything almost legally, with soviet le'gality, and the pow-er at the 
last moment was taken not by the Soviet, but by an obviously "illegal" 
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organization created ad hoc.' Pokrovsky here cites the' f8Jct · that 
Trotsky was compelled 'in the name of the Military Revolutionary 
Committee,' and not the Soviet, to declare the government of Kerensky 
non-existent. A most, unexpected conclusion! The Military Revolu-
tionary Committee was an elected organ of the Soviet. The leading 
role of the Committee in the overturn did not in any sense 'Violate 
that soviet legality which the 'professor makes fun of but of w!hich 
the mass,es were extremely jealous." (Trotsky: History of the Russian 
Revolution-Vol. 11[, Page 288.) 
After these explanations of Trotsky about the defensive 
slogans whereby the Bolsheviks organized their victoriotls struggle 
for power it should not be necessary to say anything more on the 
subject. The method here acquires unimpeachable authority by vir-
tue of the fact that it was not only expounded, but also successfully 
applied to the greatest revolution in history. In this light tne 
defensive formulations employed by us in the Minneapolis trial, far 
from being repudiated, must .be underscored more decisively. They 
are the right formulations for a propagandistic 'approach to "the 
American workers. And they are the best methods for the mobil-
ization of the workers for mass action throughout all stages of the 
development of the proletarian revolution in the United States. 
New York) May 1942. 
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